IRAC Example: 3 Full IRACs Across Different Legal Writing

A barge owned by the Conners Company was moored at a pier in New York Harbor. The bargee (the person responsible for the barge) was absent for 21 hours. Carroll Towing's tug was readjusting the lines of another vessel and caused the Conners barge to break free, drift, and sink with its cargo of flour. The United States, as owner of the cargo, sued.

Whether the absence of the bargee constituted contributory negligence that should reduce the bargee-owner's recovery — and more broadly, what standard governs whether a party's precaution was reasonable.

A party's duty to take precautions against harm is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that harm will occur (P), (2) the magnitude of the resulting injury (L), and (3) the burden of taking the precaution (B). Liability for failure to take a precaution attaches if B < PL — that is, if the burden of the precaution is less than the probability of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm.

Applying the formula to the bargee's 21-hour absence: the burden (B) of having a bargee aboard during daylight business hours in a busy wartime harbor was modest. The probability (P) of a collision or line-readjustment by another vessel during that time was substantial. The potential injury (L) — loss of barge and cargo — was high. Because B was less than PL, the bargee's absence was unreasonable. The bargee-owner failed in its duty to take the precaution.

Yes. The bargee-owner was contributorily negligent because the cost of the precaution (a present bargee) was less than the expected cost of harm. Recovery was reduced accordingly.

A driver owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons foreseeably affected by his driving, including pedestrians in or near a crosswalk. Pena was walking near a crosswalk on a public road during a rainstorm — a foreseeable context in which a driver's conduct can cause injury. Davis therefore owed Pena a duty of reasonable care.

Breach is determined by comparing the defendant's conduct to that of a reasonable person under the circumstances. Driving 5 mph over the limit on a wet road is some evidence of breach but not dispositive on its own — exceeding a posted speed limit is negligence per se in most jurisdictions if the statute's purpose is to protect the class of plaintiff from the type of harm involved. Speed limits are designed to protect road users (including pedestrians) from collisions of this kind, so the per se doctrine likely applies. Davis breached.

Causation requires both actual cause ("but for") and proximate cause (foreseeability). But for Davis's excessive speed, his braking distance would have been shorter and he might have avoided the collision — actual cause is satisfied. Proximate cause is also satisfied because injury to a pedestrian struck by an over-speeding vehicle is precisely the type of harm a speed limit protects against. Both prongs are met.

Pena stepped off the curb mid-block while distracted by her phone and did not check for traffic. A reasonable pedestrian would have looked for oncoming vehicles before entering a road, particularly mid-block where a crosswalk does not apply. Pena therefore breached her own duty of self-care. Most jurisdictions apply comparative negligence — a jury would apportion fault between the parties. In a pure comparative state, Pena recovers reduced damages; in a modified comparative state, recovery is barred if her fault exceeds 50%. In the rare contributory-negligence jurisdiction, Pena recovers nothing.

Pena's broken arm and $40,000 in medical bills are compensable damages. Davis is liable for negligence; Pena's recovery will be reduced by her percentage of fault under comparative negligence, and may be barred entirely in a contributory-negligence jurisdiction.

Pena is likely to recover for negligence, but her damages will be reduced by her own comparative fault — likely in the 30-40% range based on the fact pattern. Total recovery estimate: $24,000-$28,000 of the $40,000 in medical damages. Recovery would be barred only if a jury found her fault to exceed 50%, which is unlikely given Davis's speeding.

Negligence requires (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. In a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by her percentage of fault, and barred entirely if her fault exceeds 50%.

Drivers owe a duty of reasonable care to foreseeable road users including pedestrians (Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 7). Exceeding a speed limit designed to protect the class of plaintiff from the type of harm at issue establishes breach as a matter of law under the negligence per se doctrine. Causation requires both actual ("but for") and proximate (foreseeability) cause. In modified comparative states, pedestrian inattention reducing plaintiff recovery is routinely apportioned between 20% and 50%, depending on the visibility of the pedestrian and the egregiousness of the driver's conduct.

Davis owed Pena a duty of reasonable care as a foreseeable road user. His 5-mph speed-limit violation likely establishes breach via negligence per se — speed limits are designed to protect pedestrians from collisions of this type. Causation is satisfied: but for the excessive speed, Davis's braking distance would have been shorter and the collision could have been avoided. Damages — broken arm and $40,000 in bills — are compensable. As to Pena's contributory fault, she stepped off the curb mid-block while distracted, which a jury will treat as substantial fault. Comparable case law in this jurisdiction (cite) apportions roughly 30-40% to pedestrians in similar postures, leaving Davis with the majority of fault because of the speeding violation.

Recommend proceeding with the negligence claim. Expected recovery in the $24,000-$28,000 range. If discovery reveals additional facts about Davis's conduct (e.g., distraction, prior violations) that estimate could shift upward.