Case Brief Example: 3 Full Worked Briefs in IRAC Format

Ruth Garratt, an adult, was about to sit in a chair in her backyard when Brian Dailey, a five-year-old child, moved the chair. Garratt fell and fractured her hip. Brian claimed he moved the chair and then tried to put it back when he saw her about to sit, but was too small and too slow to replace it in time. The trial court found Brian had no purpose to injure.

Garratt sued Dailey for battery. The trial court dismissed the action, finding no willful or unlawful purpose. Garratt appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, requesting an $11,000 judgment or a new trial. The Washington Supreme Court remanded for clarification.

Whether a five-year-old child can be liable for battery when he had no purpose to injure, but may have known with substantial certainty that harmful contact would result from his act.

A defendant is liable for battery if he acts either (a) with the purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact, or (b) with knowledge that such contact is substantially certain to result from his act. Age is relevant only to what the actor knew or could foresee — not to whether the rule applies.

The trial court found no purpose to injure but did not make a definite finding on whether Brian knew with substantial certainty that Ruth would attempt to sit where the chair had been. If Brian moved the chair after Ruth had begun to sit, substantial certainty is obvious. If he moved it earlier but knew she was about to sit, the substantial-certainty test may still be satisfied — that determination is for the trier of fact. The trial court must make a specific finding on this point.

Remanded. A child can be liable for battery without a purpose to injure if he acted with substantial certainty that harmful contact would result. The trial court must make a definite finding on Brian's knowledge before judgment can be entered.

Garratt anchors the modern intent test for intentional torts: substantial-certainty knowledge is intent, even without purpose. Tested constantly in 1L Torts on exam fact patterns involving young children, prankster defendants, and intoxicated actors.

An uncle promised his nephew $5,000 if the nephew refrained from drinking alcohol, using tobacco, swearing, and gambling until he turned 21. The nephew accepted and abstained from all four for six years. When he turned 21, he wrote his uncle requesting payment. The uncle wrote back acknowledging the debt and saying the money was being held for him, but the uncle died before transferring it. The nephew assigned his claim to Hamer. Sidway, the estate's executor, refused to pay.

Hamer sued Sidway to recover the $5,000 from the estate. The trial court ruled for Hamer. The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding there was no consideration because the nephew suffered no detriment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate court, reinstating judgment for Hamer.

Whether a promise to refrain from lawful activities — drinking, smoking, swearing, gambling — at the request of a promisor constitutes sufficient consideration to make the promise enforceable.

Consideration is either a benefit to the promisor or a legal detriment to the promisee. A promisee's surrender of a legal right — abandoning conduct he was free to engage in — is a legal detriment and is sufficient consideration, regardless of whether the promisor receives any actual benefit or the promisee suffers any practical harm.

The nephew had a legal right to drink, smoke, swear, and gamble. By giving up those rights at the uncle's request, the nephew incurred a legal detriment. Whether abstention was beneficial to the nephew personally is irrelevant — the law looks at whether the promisee gave up something he was entitled to do, not whether he was better off afterward. The uncle's request, and the nephew's compliance for six years, makes the abstention bargained-for consideration.

Yes. The nephew's forbearance was valid consideration. The promise was enforceable, and the estate must pay the $5,000.

Hamer is the textbook case for the rule that consideration requires legal — not economic — detriment. It comes up in every 1L Contracts course on the consideration unit and in exam fact patterns involving gratuitous-looking promises that are actually bargained-for.

International Shoe, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Missouri, employed 11-13 salesmen who lived and solicited orders in Washington State. The salesmen took orders, sent them to St. Louis for acceptance, and shipments were made to Washington customers. International Shoe had no offices, contracts, or stock of goods in Washington. Washington assessed unemployment taxes against International Shoe; the company refused to pay, arguing the state lacked personal jurisdiction.

Washington served notice on a salesman in the state and mailed it to International Shoe's Missouri headquarters. The state administrative body ruled for Washington; Washington courts affirmed. International Shoe appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed.

Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that has no physical presence in the forum state but conducts continuous and systematic business activity there through agents.

Due process requires that, for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant not physically present in the forum, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The nature and quality of the contacts determines whether jurisdiction is proper; continuous and systematic activity giving rise to the claim suffices.

International Shoe's activities in Washington — continuous solicitation, large volume of interstate orders, and resulting in shipments to Washington customers — were systematic and substantial, not casual or isolated. Those activities established a sufficient connection with the state to make jurisdiction reasonable. The unemployment-tax obligations arose directly out of those very activities, satisfying the relatedness component. Subjecting International Shoe to suit in Washington therefore did not offend fair play and substantial justice.

Yes. Washington had personal jurisdiction over International Shoe. The minimum-contacts test, not physical presence, governs due-process limits on personal jurisdiction.

International Shoe is the single most-tested PJ case in 1L Civ Pro. Every subsequent personal-jurisdiction case — World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi, Burger King, Daimler, Goodyear, Bristol-Myers Squibb — extends or refines the minimum-contacts framework announced here.