CREAC Example: A Full Legal Memo, Labeled Element by Element

A court will likely find that Owen acted with the intent required for battery. Owen did not need to want Dana to fall or to get hurt. It is enough that, when he stretched out his leg, he knew with substantial certainty that she would walk into it. Owen's age, his "watch this" remark, and his choice to block a narrow doorway in front of someone who could not see the floor give a factfinder strong grounds to infer that knowledge.

A defendant is liable for battery when his act causes a harmful contact with another person, the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact (or an apprehension of one), and the contact is neither consented to nor privileged. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 13 (Am. L. Inst. 1934)). Only intent is disputed here. An actor has that intention if he acts for the purpose of causing the contact or with knowledge that the contact is substantially certain to result. Id.; Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). A defendant who has that knowledge is liable even if he had no wish to injure the plaintiff. Garratt, 279 P.2d 1091.

In Garratt, a boy of five years and nine months, Brian Dailey, moved a lawn chair in a backyard just before an adult, Ruth Garratt, tried to sit down where it had been. She fell and fractured her hip. Id. The trial court accepted Brian's account: he moved the chair a few feet and sat in it, then saw Ms. Garratt about to sit where it had been, got up, and tried to move it toward her, but because of his small size and lack of dexterity he could not get it under her in time. Id. Finding that Brian had no willful or unlawful purpose and no intent to injure her, the trial court dismissed the case. Id.

The Washington Supreme Court held that those findings did not end the inquiry. Intent includes acting with knowledge that a contact is "substantially certain to be produced," and the absence of any intent to injure Ms. Garratt, to play a prank on her, or to embarrass her would not absolve Brian of liability if he in fact had that knowledge. Id. A battery would be established if Brian knew with substantial certainty, when he moved the chair, that Ms. Garratt would attempt to sit down where the chair had been. Id. Without that knowledge, the court said, there would be nothing wrongful about moving the chair. Id. Brian's age mattered only in determining what he knew. Id. Because the trial court's findings did not specifically cover the question of Brian's knowledge, the Supreme Court remanded for clarification. Id. On remand, after reconsidering the time sequence, the trial court found that Ms. Garratt was already in the act of sitting down when Brian moved the chair, and that he knew with substantial certainty she would attempt to sit down where it had been. It entered judgment for her of $11,000, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Garratt v. Dailey, 304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956).

The Washington Supreme Court later relied on the same definition outside battery. In Bradley, a trespass case, it quoted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A and its comment b, under which an actor who knows a consequence is "certain, or substantially certain," to result "and still goes ahead" is treated as if he had in fact desired it, and it discussed Garratt in doing so. Bradley, 709 P.2d 782. The dividing line in both cases is knowledge, not motive.

Under the Garratt test, the facts point toward knowledge here. Like Brian, Owen never had to touch Dana with his hands; his act put an obstacle where she was about to step, just as Brian's put empty space where Ms. Garratt was about to sit. Unlike Brian, Owen is thirteen. Because Garratt makes age relevant to what the defendant knew, a thirteen-year-old's greater experience and understanding make it easier to infer that Owen knew a person carrying a large tray through a narrow doorway could not see the floor and would walk into whatever was there. The timing points the same way, and timing mattered in Garratt: knowledge was found once the trial court concluded that Ms. Garratt was already sitting down when Brian moved the chair. Owen stretched out his leg as Dana approached, leaving her little chance to notice it, and he did not pull it back as she reached the doorway. His "watch this" to a friend suggests he expected something to happen when she got there.

Owen will argue that he expected Dana to see his leg and step over it, so that at most he took a risk. If a factfinder believes him, the claim fails: under Garratt, without knowledge there is nothing wrongful about the act. But Owen's own explanation, that he wanted to see what she would do, concedes he was testing whether she would notice, and Sam Lee's account of the "watch this" remark undercuts the claim that he expected her to step over his leg. Owen's lack of any wish to hurt Dana does not help him. Garratt holds that the absence of an intent to injure or to play a prank does not absolve a defendant who had the required knowledge.

Owen likely acted with the intent required for battery. A factfinder is likely to find that a thirteen-year-old who said "watch this" and stretched his leg across a narrow doorway in front of someone who could not see the floor knew with substantial certainty that she would trip over it. The prediction depends on Sam Lee's testimony. If a factfinder instead credits Owen's account that he expected Dana to step over his leg, the battery claim would fail on intent. We should interview Sam Lee and Owen's friend soon.