Does a state minimum wage law for women violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting freedom of contract?

The State of Washington enacted a minimum wage law in 1913 entitled "Minimum Wages for Women," which authorized the fixing of minimum wages for women and minors. The law created an Industrial Welfare Commission to establish wage standards and conditions of labor for women and minors that would be sufficient for decent maintenance and not detrimental to health and morals. West Coast Hotel Co. operated a hotel and employed Elsie Parrish as a chambermaid. The minimum wage was set at $14.50 per week for 48 hours of work. Parrish and her husband brought suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage required by state law. The hotel company challenged the statute as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing it impermissibly restricted freedom of contract. The trial court initially ruled against Parrish, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and sustained the statute, directing judgment for the plaintiffs.

Elsie Parrish and her husband filed suit against West Coast Hotel Co. to recover unpaid wages under Washington's minimum wage law. The trial court ruled in favor of the hotel company, finding the minimum wage statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court's decision, sustaining the statute and directing judgment for the plaintiffs. West Coast Hotel Co. appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted review of the case.

(Hughes, J.)

No. The Washington minimum wage law does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract but rather of liberty, which is necessarily subject to restraints of due process. Liberty under the Constitution is subject to reasonable regulations adopted in the interests of the community. Freedom of contract is a qualified, not absolute right, and the state has broad protective power to regulate the relationship between employer and employee.

The principle established in cases like Holden v. Hardy demonstrates that the state may exercise its police power when parties do not stand upon an equality, recognizing that proprietors and operatives have conflicting interests and that employees are often constrained to accept detrimental conditions due to fear of discharge. This principle is particularly applicable to women's employment, as established in Muller v. Oregon, where the Court recognized that women's physical structure and maternal functions place them at a disadvantage in employment and make them proper subjects for protective legislation.

The distinction drawn in Adkins v. Children's Hospital between minimum wage and maximum hours regulations lacks satisfactory justification. Both wage and hour restrictions equally affect the terms of employment contracts, as one is the multiplier and the other the multiplicand in determining total compensation. The state's interest in protecting women workers from exploitation through inadequate wages is as compelling as its interest in limiting working hours.

The Washington statute provides for fair consideration through representatives of employers, employees, and the public in setting minimum wages. It accounts for individual circumstances by allowing special licenses for women incapable of full service. The legislature was entitled to consider that women constitute a class receiving the least pay, have relatively weak bargaining power, and are vulnerable to exploitation through the "sweating system" of inadequate wages.

Recent economic conditions have demonstrated that exploitation of workers in unequal bargaining positions creates a direct burden on the community, as taxpayers must provide relief when wages are insufficient for basic living needs. The community should not be required to subsidize unconscionable employers who disregard the public interest. Adkins v. Children's Hospital is therefore overruled.

Dissent (Sutherland, J.) The meaning of the Constitution does not change with economic conditions. Constitutional interpretation must remain consistent with the original understanding of the framers, and courts cannot modify constitutional provisions based on changing circumstances. The remedy for constitutional provisions that seem ill-adapted to new conditions is amendment, not judicial reinterpretation. The Washington statute is identical in substance to the law struck down in Adkins v. Children's Hospital and contains the same constitutional defects. The Due Process Clause includes freedom of contract as a fundamental right, and minimum wage legislation for women creates arbitrary discrimination by treating adult women differently from men in their capacity to contract. The statute ignores the employer's circumstances and ability to pay, compelling payment regardless of the value of services rendered or the employer's business conditions. It shifts to employers a burden that belongs to society as a whole and violates the principle that employment contracts should reflect some relation of just equivalence between payment and service. Women today stand upon legal and political equality with men and should not be subjected to different contractual restrictions that deny them the right to compete with men for lower-wage employment.