Can a state recognize and enforce a moral obligation based on material benefits received by the promisor?

The Court of Appeals rendered an opinion addressing whether the state could recognize and compensate for moral obligations. The case involved a distinction between different types of moral obligations - those based merely on refined ethical duty without material benefit to the promisor, versus those where the promisor received material and substantial benefits. The Court of Appeals recognized that when a benefit is material and substantial and was received by the person of the promisor rather than to his estate, it falls within a class of material benefits that may be recognized and compensated through either executed payment or executory promise to pay. The compensation was not only for benefits received by the promisor, but also for injuries to the property or person of the promisee by reason of the service rendered.

The case was decided by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner sought certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari but issued this opinion to clarify its position on the principles declared by the Court of Appeals.

(Foster, J.)

Yes. The state may recognize a moral obligation and enforce it when based on material and substantial benefits received by the promisor. A distinction exists between supposed moral obligations based on refined ethical duty without material benefit and those where material benefit actually occurred. State v. Clements, 220 Ala. 515, 126 So. 162; Board of Revenue of Mobile v. Puckett, 227 Ala. 374, 149 So. 850; Board of Revenue of Jefferson County v. Hewitt, 206 Ala. 405, 90 So. 781; Moses v. Tigner, 168 So. 194. When the benefit is material and substantial and was received by the person of the promisor rather than to his estate, it falls within the class of material benefits which the promisor has the privilege of recognizing and compensating either by executed payment or executory promise to pay. The reasoning is particularly strong when compensation covers not only benefits received by the promisor but also injuries to the property or person of the promisee resulting from the service rendered. However, the state cannot recompense for mere ethical obligations or perform courteous or generous acts without a material and substantial claim to payment, even if such claim is not legally enforceable, nor may executory obligations be incurred on such basis.