Does a village zoning ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings, and defining 'family' to exclude groups of more than two unrelated persons living together, violate the Equal Protection Clause or fundamental rights of association, privacy, or travel?

Belle Terre, a village on Long Island's north shore, contained about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people and covered less than one square mile. Its ordinance restricted land use to one-family dwellings and excluded lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, and multiple-dwelling houses. The ordinance defined 'family' as one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, or no more than two unrelated persons living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit.

The Dickmans owned a house in the village and in December 1971 leased it for 18 months to Michael Truman. Bruce Boraas later became a colessee, and Anne Parish moved in along with three others. These six were students at nearby State University at Stony Brook, and none was related to another by blood, adoption, or marriage. The village served the Dickmans with an 'Order to Remedy Violations' of the ordinance. The owners and three tenants then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an injunction and a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.

The Dickmans and three tenants filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The District Court held the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, with one judge dissenting. The village appealed to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

(Douglas, J.)

No. The ordinance is constitutional. It involves no fundamental right and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective.

The ordinance is economic and social legislation. It is not aimed at transients, imposes no procedural disparity on some but not others, and involves no fundamental right such as voting, association, access to the courts, or privacy. Such legislation withstands an Equal Protection challenge if it is reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

The village's goals are legitimate. The police power is not confined to eliminating filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Boarding houses and fraternity houses bring more people per space, more cars, more parking, and more noise, so limiting land use to family needs is permissible.

The line between related and unrelated persons is not arbitrary. Every legislative line leaves some out that might have been included, and drawing such lines is a legislative, not judicial, function. The ordinance is also not hostile to unmarried couples, since it treats two unrelated people as a family. It does not restrict other forms of association, because a family may entertain whomever it likes.

The case is not moot. A zoning ordinance affects property value, and the lessors' rental values turn on the outcome. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed.

Dissent (Brennan, J.) The tenant appellees have moved out and have no remaining interest to vindicate. The lessor appellees do not satisfy the exception allowing assertion of third parties' rights: their own brief negates any economic injury, criminal prosecution is unclear, and nothing shows future tenants could not assert their own rights. No cognizable case or controversy exists. The judgment should be vacated and remanded for the District Court to determine whether the case should be dismissed. The majority rejected this view, finding a live controversy because the ordinance affects the lessor's property value and rental income.

Dissent (Marshall, J.) The ordinance burdens the fundamental rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, so strict scrutiny applies rather than rational-basis review. Choosing one's household companions involves deeply personal lifestyle choices. The village may pursue legitimate goals such as controlling density, traffic, and noise, but the means are both overinclusive and underinclusive. The ordinance places no limit on large related families yet bars three unrelated retirees from a large house. The majority answered that every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out and that line-drawing is a legislative, not judicial, function, and that the ordinance leaves other forms of association untouched. Narrower, even-handed alternatives exist, such as limiting the number of adults per household. The village has acted to fence out those whose lifestyle differs from that of current residents, and the ordinance is unconstitutional.