Are tugs required to carry effective radio equipment to receive weather forecasts, and does the failure to do so constitute unseaworthiness rendering them liable for cargo losses during storms?

On March 7, 1928, tugs T.J. Hooper and Montrose departed Hampton Roads with coal barges bound for New York and New England ports. No storm warnings were issued until March 9th at 9:30 a.m. at Delaware breakwater. Both tows encountered severe weather on March 9th near Atlantic City. The Northern 17 and Northern 30 barges began taking on water and eventually sank after their crews were rescued. Four other tugs that departed the same day (Mars, Waltham, A.L. Walker, and Menominee) received radio weather forecasts on March 8th predicting easterly winds and sought refuge at Delaware breakwater. The T.J. Hooper had a practically useless radio set belonging to its master, while the Montrose had an ineffective homemade radio set. Neither tug received the March 8th weather broadcasts. Both captains testified they would have sought shelter at the breakwater if they had received the weather reports. The Northern 17 was overloaded with 1,765 tons of coal (sprinkled with 5,125 gallons of water), exceeding its capacity and making it sit lower in the water than ever before. The Northern 30 was leaking between one and one-and-a-half feet per day while in the stream at Hampton Roads.

Cargo owners filed libels against the barge owner for cargo losses from the foundering of barges Northern 17 and Northern 30. The tug owner instituted limitation proceedings seeking relief from liability while denying fault. The barge owner answered the limitation proceedings, asserting negligent towage by the tugs and claiming for the value of the barges. The cargo owners also answered, alleging negligent towage and contesting the right to limit liability. All cases were consolidated and tried together as one action.

(Coxe, J.)

Yes. The tugs were required to carry effective radio equipment and their failure to do so constituted unseaworthiness rendering them liable for cargo losses. The standard of seaworthiness is not dependent on statutory enactment but changes with advancing knowledge, experience, and new appliances of navigation. Radio broadcasting was widespread by March 1928, being utilized in almost every field of activity for communication and information dissemination. The government broadcast weather reports twice daily from Arlington, providing important navigational information that mariners could not afford to ignore.

Testimony established that 90 percent of coastwise tugs were equipped with radio sets, and Captain Powell of the Menominee testified that he regarded radio as part of the necessary equipment of every reasonably well-equipped tug in coastwise service. The extensive use of radio amounted almost to a universal practice in coastwise tug navigation. Therefore, there was a duty on the tug owner to supply effective receiving sets.

The Hooper's radio was practically useless and generally out of order, while the Montrose had an ineffective homemade set. Neither received the March 8th weather broadcasts that led the other four tugs to seek shelter at Delaware breakwater. Both captains admitted they would have gone to the breakwater if they had received the weather reports. Had the tugs been properly equipped with working radios, they would have avoided the storm that caused the losses.

Regarding the barges' unseaworthiness, the Northern 17 was overloaded with cargo exceeding its capacity by at least 20 tons due to water sprinkling, making it sit lower than ever before. The Northern 30 was leaking one to one-and-a-half feet per day, well above the five-inch standard for seaworthiness. However, the damages should be divided between the tug owner and barge owner due to the concurrent fault of both parties.