Do therapists have a legal obligation to warn third parties of potential violence by their patients, and are they shielded from liability if they fail to issue such warnings?

On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Prior to this, in August, Poddar had informed Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist at the University of California at Berkeley's Cowell Memorial Hospital, of his intention to kill Tarasoff. Moore requested campus police detain Poddar, but they released him after he appeared rational. Subsequently, Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore's superior, directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. Neither Tarasoff nor her parents were warned of the potential danger.

Following Tarasoff's death, her parents initiated a lawsuit against the therapists and police officers involved. The lawsuit alleged negligence on the part of these parties for failing to warn Tarasoff or her parents about the threat Poddar posed, or to take action to protect her from harm.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants in superior court. The defendants responded by filing demurrers to the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint. The superior court sustained the defendants' demurrers to the plaintiffs' second amended complaints without granting leave to amend. Following this decision, the plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the California Supreme Court.

(Tobriner, J.)

Yes. Therapists have a legal obligation to warn third parties of potential violence by their patients and are not shielded from liability if they fail to issue such warnings when appropriate. This duty arises when a therapist determines, or should determine based on professional standards, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others. The obligation stems from the special relationship between therapist and patient, which creates a duty to use reasonable care to protect foreseeable victims. This duty may require warning the intended victim, notifying others who can warn the victim, contacting law enforcement, or taking other reasonable steps to prevent harm. The foreseeability of harm to third parties and the public interest in safety from violent assault further justify imposing this duty on therapists. Importantly, the failure to warn is not considered a basic policy decision that would grant immunity under Government Code section 820.2. The discretionary nature of the therapist's professional judgment does not shield them from liability for breaching this duty of care. However, therapists do maintain immunity from liability for failing to confine a patient under Government Code section 856. This distinction recognizes the complex balance between patient confidentiality, public safety, and professional responsibility. The imposition of this duty reflects a careful weighing of competing interests, acknowledging both the importance of the therapeutic relationship and the broader societal need to prevent foreseeable violence. By establishing this obligation, the law aims to strike a balance that protects potential victims while preserving the essential functions of mental health treatment.

Concurrence/Dissent (Mosk, J.) The majority's decision is correct only because the complaints allege that therapists actually predicted Poddar would kill. Imposing liability based on professional standards for predicting violence is misguided. Psychiatric predictions are inherently unreliable and should not form the basis for legal duty. This approach risks overextending therapist liability and may lead to excessive caution in mental health treatment.

Dissent (Clark, J.) The majority's ruling directly contradicts the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which mandates confidentiality in psychotherapist-patient relationships. Imposing a duty to warn will severely impair effective treatment and paradoxically increase violence. This decision may lead to unnecessary commitments, as therapists err on the side of caution to avoid liability. The long-term consequences for mental health care and patient trust could be profound and detrimental.

Dissent (McComb, J.) Concurred with Clark's dissenting opinion without providing a separate written opinion.