Must an employment discrimination complaint contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive a motion to dismiss?

Akos Swierkiewicz, a Hungarian native who was 53 years old at the time of his complaint, began working in April 1989 for Sorema N. A., a New York reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation. He was employed as senior vice president and chief underwriting officer (CUO). Nearly six years later, Sorema's CEO, François Chavel, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz to a marketing and services position and transferred most of his underwriting responsibilities to Nicholas Papadopoulo, a 32-year-old French national. About a year later, Chavel stated he wanted to "energize" the underwriting department and appointed Papadopoulo as CUO. Swierkiewicz alleged that Papadopoulo had only one year of underwriting experience and was less qualified than Swierkiewicz, who had 26 years of experience in the insurance industry.

After the demotion, Swierkiewicz alleged he was isolated, excluded from business decisions and meetings, and denied the opportunity to reach his potential. His attempts to meet with Chavel were unsuccessful. In April 1997, he sent Chavel a memo outlining his grievances and requesting a severance package. Two weeks later, Sorema's general counsel offered him a choice between resigning without severance or being dismissed. Chavel fired him when he refused to resign.

Swierkiewicz sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging termination on account of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The District Court dismissed the complaint because Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, specifically circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on circuit precedent requiring employment discrimination plaintiffs to allege facts constituting a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the proper pleading standard in employment discrimination cases.

(Thomas, J.)

No. An employment discrimination complaint need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

The prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. McDonnell Douglas addressed the "order and allocation of proof" in a discrimination case, and later cases such as Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), reiterated that the prima facie case governs the plaintiff's burden of presenting evidence. The Court has never extended those requirements to pleading, and it previously rejected a demand for greater particularity in Title VII complaints in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The ordinary test for sufficiency of a complaint applies: the question is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he is entitled to offer evidence supporting his claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

A prima facie pleading requirement is also unworkable. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every case; a plaintiff with direct evidence of discrimination may prevail without proving every element of a prima facie case. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). It would be incongruous to demand more at the pleading stage than a plaintiff may ultimately need to prove. The elements of a prima facie case are flexible and vary with context, and were never meant to be "rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).

A heightened standard also conflicts with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only fair notice of the claim and its grounds. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Rule 9(b) imposes particularity only for fraud or mistake, and under expressio unius the Court declines to add other exceptions. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Liberal discovery, Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite statement, and Rule 56 summary judgment dispose of meritless claims. Swierkiewicz's complaint detailed the events leading to his termination, gave relevant dates, and identified ages and nationalities of those involved, giving fair notice and stating claims under Title VII and the ADEA. Concerns about burdening courts must be addressed by amending the Rules, not by judicial interpretation. The judgment is reversed and remanded.