Can a battered wife claim perfect self-defense when she kills her sleeping husband?

Judy Ann Laws Norman was married to John Thomas Norman for 25 years, during which she endured severe and prolonged abuse. The abuse included physical violence, emotional torment, forced prostitution, and death threats. On June 12, 1985, following three days of intensified mistreatment, Norman fatally shot her sleeping husband three times in the back of the head. Prior to this incident, Norman had made unsuccessful attempts to leave the abusive relationship and seek assistance.

Expert witnesses testified that Norman exhibited symptoms consistent with battered wife syndrome. The case record indicates a pattern of escalating abuse leading up to the shooting. Despite Norman's efforts to escape the situation, she had been unable to find a lasting solution to the ongoing abuse before the fatal incident occurred.

Norman was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial, the jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The court sentenced Norman to six years in prison. Norman appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted her a new trial, ruling that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on perfect self-defense. Following this decision, the State appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

(Mitchell, J.)

No. A battered wife cannot claim perfect self-defense when she kills her sleeping husband. The concept of "imminence" in self-defense law requires an immediate threat of death or great bodily harm at the time of the killing. This requirement cannot be expanded to include speculative future harm, even in cases involving battered wife syndrome. The sleeping state of the victim precludes the existence of an immediate threat necessary to justify the use of deadly force in self-defense. Relaxing this requirement would effectively legalize vigilante justice, undermining the fundamental principles of the criminal justice system. The law of self-defense is predicated on the necessity of using force to protect oneself from an imminent threat, not as a preemptive measure against potential future harm. While the history of abuse in cases involving battered women is a significant factor, it does not override the legal requirement for immediacy in self-defense claims. The psychological impact of prolonged abuse, while relevant to understanding the defendant's state of mind, does not alter the objective standard for reasonable fear of imminent harm required by self-defense law. This strict interpretation of imminence serves to maintain the balance between protecting victims of domestic violence and preserving the integrity of the legal system's approach to justifiable homicide.

Dissent (Martin, J.) The evidence was sufficient to require a jury instruction on self-defense. 'Imminence' should be interpreted from the defendant's perspective, considering the constant state of fear experienced by battered women. The jury should have been allowed to consider whether Norman's belief in the necessity of her actions was reasonable given her circumstances. This interpretation acknowledges the unique psychological impact of prolonged abuse and allows for a more nuanced application of self-defense law in cases involving domestic violence. Failing to provide this instruction potentially denies justice to victims of sustained abuse who may see no other means of escape.