Does a state court's judicial enforcement of a private racially restrictive covenant that bars purchasers from owning or occupying real property because of their race or color constitute state action that denies equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?

In the Missouri case, thirty of thirty-nine property owners along Labadie Avenue in St. Louis signed a 1911 agreement, later recorded, restricting occupancy for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race and barring occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. Several parcels in the district had long been occupied by Negro families, some since 1882. In 1945, petitioners Shelley, who are Negroes, bought a parcel by warranty deed from a seller, and the trial court found they had no actual knowledge of the covenant. Other owners in the restricted district sued to prevent the Shelleys from taking possession and to divest their title.

In the Michigan case, a 1934 agreement among Detroit property owners provided that the property could not be used or occupied by anyone except persons of the Caucasian race, effective once eighty percent of the lots in the block were bound, and remaining in effect until 1960. That threshold was met. In 1944, petitioners McGhee, who are Negroes, acquired a parcel in the block and took occupancy. Neighboring owners bound by the agreement sued to remove them and bar their future use or occupancy.

In the Missouri case, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis in October 1945 to restrain the Shelleys from taking possession and to divest their title. The trial court denied relief on the ground that the covenant never became effective because not all owners in the district had signed it. The Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc, reversed, held the agreement effective, and directed the trial court to grant the requested relief, concluding that enforcement violated no federal constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the Michigan case, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of Wayne County in January 1945. After a hearing, the trial court ordered petitioners to vacate the property within ninety days and enjoined future use or occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, rejecting petitioners' Fourteenth Amendment claims. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the Michigan case (No. 87, McGhee v. Sipes) was considered together with the Missouri case.

(Vinson, J.)

Yes. Judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by state courts is state action that denies equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The covenants themselves, as private agreements, do not violate the Amendment, which erects no shield against merely private conduct. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). So long as the covenants are honored voluntarily, no state action exists. Here, however, the covenants were given effect only through judicial enforcement.

The action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). That principle applies even where the court enforces a common-law rule rather than a statute, as in American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

These were not cases of a State merely abstaining from action. Petitioners were willing purchasers, and the owners were willing sellers. But for the active intervention of the state courts, backed by the full coercive power of the State, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties. The state courts denied them, because of race or color, property rights available to other citizens. The right to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property is among the civil rights the Fourteenth Amendment protects, and it is recognized in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), held that such restrictions could not be imposed by state statute or ordinance.

The argument that courts would equally enforce covenants excluding whites fails because Fourteenth Amendment rights are personal rights, and equal protection is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities. The argument that denying enforcement harms the covenanting owners also fails because the Constitution confers no right to demand state action that denies equal protection to others. The Court therefore reversed both judgments and did not reach the due process and privileges and immunities claims.