Is a state law that criminalizes abortion, except when necessary to save the mother's life, constitutional?

Jane Roe, a single woman in Dallas County, Texas, sought to terminate her pregnancy but was unable to obtain a legal abortion in the state as her life was not endangered by continuing the pregnancy. She filed a federal lawsuit against the Dallas County District Attorney, challenging Texas' criminal abortion laws on constitutional grounds. Dr. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, intervened in Roe's case, citing his previous arrests and pending prosecutions for violating abortion statutes. Separately, John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to Roe's lawsuit. They claimed Mrs. Doe's health would be at risk if she became pregnant, but they were unable to obtain an abortion under the existing laws.

Roe initiated a federal lawsuit against the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge District Court panel heard the case. The panel ruled that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional, but denied the request for injunctive relief. Following this decision, both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, upon receiving the appeals, opted to postpone its decision on jurisdiction until after hearing the merits of the case.

(Blackmun, J.)

No. A state law that criminalizes abortion, except when necessary to save the mother's life, is unconstitutional. The right to privacy, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. This fundamental right, however, is not absolute and must be balanced against compelling state interests. The state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling only at the point of viability. Prior to this point, the state cannot interfere with a woman's right to choose abortion without demonstrating a compelling interest.

The trimester framework established in this decision provides a clear structure for balancing the competing interests. During the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman and her physician without state interference. In the second trimester, the state may only regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related to maternal health. It is only in the third trimester, after viability, that the state's interest in potential life becomes compelling enough to justify regulations and even prohibitions on abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

This decision is grounded in the long-recognized right to personal privacy and bodily autonomy. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, but previous decisions have recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. This right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

The state's interest in protecting potential life must be reconciled with the woman's fundamental right to privacy. While the state has legitimate interests in protecting both the health of the pregnant woman and the potentiality of human life, these interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling."

The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.

Concurrence (Burger, C.J.) Concurred with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Concurrence (Douglas, J.) Concurred with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Concurrence (Stewart, J.) The right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion is protected by the Constitution. This right is grounded in the concept of personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court's decision recognizes that this fundamental right cannot be infringed upon without compelling state interests.

Dissent (White, J.) Dissented with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) The right of privacy is not involved in this case. The Court's decision has gone beyond the issues presented. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to abortion. This ruling represents an overreach of judicial authority and misinterprets the Constitution's intent regarding state powers in this matter.