Can a state criminally punish a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication without violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment?

Leroy Powell was arrested and charged with public intoxication in Austin, Texas. He had a history of approximately 100 convictions for public intoxication since 1949. Powell worked at a tavern shining shoes, earning about $12 weekly, which he used to purchase wine. He typically became intoxicated once a week and often fell asleep in public places while drunk.

During the trial, Dr. David Wade, a psychiatrist, testified that Powell was a 'chronic alcoholic' with an uncontrollable compulsion to drink. Dr. Wade stated that Powell had reached a point where he could not control his behavior when intoxicated. The trial court determined that Powell suffered from chronic alcoholism, a disease that had destroyed his willpower to resist excessive alcohol consumption.

Powell was initially tried in the Corporation Court of Austin, Texas, where he was found guilty and fined $20. He then appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas. There, a trial de novo was held, resulting in Powell again being found guilty, with an increased fine of $50. Following this second conviction, Powell appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, agreeing to hear the case.

(Marshall, J.)

Yes. A state can criminally punish a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication without violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The criminalization of public intoxication, even for chronic alcoholics, does not constitute punishment for status but rather for specific conduct. This distinction is crucial in determining the constitutionality of such laws under the Eighth Amendment. The state has legitimate interests in preventing public drunkenness and maintaining order, which justify the use of criminal sanctions. The current state of medical knowledge does not provide a clear, effective alternative to criminal penalties for addressing the public aspects of problem drinking. Furthermore, unlike diseases or conditions that render a person powerless to avoid violating the law, chronic alcoholism does not deprive individuals of their ability to choose not to appear in public while intoxicated. The decision to be in public while intoxicated is a voluntary act, separate from the involuntary condition of alcoholism itself. This voluntary aspect of the offense distinguishes it from punishing the mere status of being an alcoholic, which would be unconstitutional under Robinson v. California. The use of criminal sanctions in this context serves important societal goals of public safety and order, outweighing concerns about punishing individuals for a chronic condition. The law recognizes the complex nature of alcoholism but maintains that criminal penalties for public manifestations of the condition are within the state's power to regulate public behavior and protect community interests.

Concurrence (Black, J.) States must be allowed to experiment with different approaches to social problems. The Court should not become a board of Platonic Guardians imposing their views on local communities. This approach respects the principles of federalism and allows for diverse solutions to complex societal issues.

Concurrence (White, J.) If it were shown that a chronic alcoholic had no control over his appearance in public while intoxicated, punishing him might violate the Eighth Amendment. This leaves open the possibility for future cases to establish a constitutional protection for individuals whose actions are truly involuntary due to medical conditions.

Dissent (Fortas, J.) Punishing Powell for public intoxication violates the Eighth Amendment because his public drunkenness was involuntary due to his chronic alcoholism. This case is analogous to Robinson v. California, where punishing someone for the status of being a drug addict was deemed unconstitutional. The Court's decision fails to recognize the medical nature of addiction and improperly criminalizes a condition rather than an act.