Does the possibility that the substantive law of an alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff automatically bar dismissal of an action on the ground of forum non conveniens?

A small commercial Piper Aztec aircraft crashed in the Scottish highlands in July 1976 during a charter flight from Blackpool to Perth, killing the pilot and five passengers. All decedents were Scottish subjects and residents, as were their heirs. The aircraft was manufactured in Pennsylvania by Piper Aircraft Co., and its propellers were manufactured in Ohio by Hartzell Propeller, Inc. At the time of the crash, the plane was registered in Great Britain and was owned and maintained by Air Navigation and Trading Co., Ltd. It was operated by McDonald Aviation, Ltd., a Scottish air taxi service. Both companies were organized in the United Kingdom. The wreckage was in England, and British authorities had investigated the accident, finding no evidence of defective equipment and suggesting pilot error, since the recently licensed pilot was flying well below the minimum altitude required by his company's manual. A California probate court appointed Gaynell Reyno, a legal secretary to the attorney who filed the suit and a stranger to the decedents and their survivors, as administratrix of the passengers' estates. Reyno sued Piper and Hartzell for negligence and strict liability in California state court. She admitted that she filed in the United States because its liability, capacity-to-sue, and damages rules were more favorable than Scotland's, which does not recognize strict liability and permits wrongful-death suits only by relatives for loss of support and society. The survivors separately sued the pilot's estate, Air Navigation, and McDonald in the United Kingdom.

Reyno filed wrongful-death actions against Piper and Hartzell in California Superior Court, and the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Piper moved to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and Hartzell moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to transfer. In December 1977, the court quashed service on Hartzell and transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where Reyno properly served Hartzell. In May 1978, Piper and Hartzell moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, and the District Court granted the motions in October 1979. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the District Court abused its discretion in its Gilbert analysis and that dismissal is never appropriate where the alternative forum's law is less favorable to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both No. 80-848 and No. 80-883.

(Marshall, J.)

No. The possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law does not, by itself, bar dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, and it should ordinarily receive neither conclusive nor substantial weight.

Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), already rejected the Court of Appeals' position by affirming a dismissal even though the plaintiffs chose the American forum for its more favorable law. Gilbert made convenience the central focus of the inquiry and stressed flexibility, so no single factor, including the applicable law, may be dispositive. If a change in law were given substantial weight, the doctrine would become virtually useless, because plaintiffs would ordinarily select the forum with the most advantageous law. It would also force courts into complex comparative-law and choice-of-law exercises that the doctrine is meant to avoid, and it would make American courts even more attractive to foreign plaintiffs, increasing congestion.

The analogy to § 1404(a) transfers under Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), fails. Van Dusen construed a statute meant as a federal housekeeping measure within a unified federal system, not the common-law doctrine. An unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight if the alternative forum's remedy is so clearly inadequate that it is no remedy at all. Scotland's courts provide an adequate remedy.

The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in applying the Gilbert factors. A foreign plaintiff's choice of forum deserves less deference because the assumption that a home-forum choice is convenient is much less reasonable. The private interest factors supported Scotland: much of the evidence and many witnesses were in Great Britain, and Piper and Hartzell could not implead the Scottish third-party defendants (the pilot's estate, Air Navigation, and McDonald). Defendants need not identify specific witnesses and testimony in detail. The public interest factors favored Scotland because the accident occurred there, all decedents were Scottish, and Scotland has a strong local interest in the controversy. The American interest in deterrence was insufficient to justify the burden of trial here. The Third Circuit is reversed.

Concurrence in part and Dissent in part (White, J.) Joins Parts I and II of the Court's opinion but would not reach the issues addressed in Part III, and dissents to that extent.

Dissent (Stevens, J.) The only question presented in both petitions is whether a plaintiff may defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal merely by showing that the law of the district court is more favorable than the law of the alternative forum, and that question should be answered in the negative. Having answered it, the Court should simply remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the District Court correctly decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum for a claim that a Pennsylvania company defectively designed and manufactured a plane in Pennsylvania. Justice Brennan joins this dissent. The majority answered that the questions on which certiorari was granted were broad enough to justify reaching Part III, and that a limited grant is not a jurisdictional bar.