Can a defendant be convicted of substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when the defendant did not directly participate in those offenses but was part of an ongoing conspiracy?

Walter and Daniel Pinkerton, brothers living near each other on Daniel's farm, were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The indictment contained ten substantive counts and one conspiracy count. The jury found Walter guilty on nine substantive counts and the conspiracy count, while Daniel was found guilty on six substantive counts and the conspiracy count. A single conspiracy was charged and proved, with some overt acts charged in the conspiracy count being the same acts charged in the substantive counts. Each substantive offense was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. There was no evidence that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction was sustained, although there was evidence that Walter committed these substantive offenses in furtherance of the unlawful agreement between the brothers. Daniel was in the penitentiary for other crimes when some of Walter's crimes were committed.

Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code with ten substantive counts and one conspiracy count. Following jury trial, Walter was convicted on nine substantive counts and the conspiracy count, while Daniel was convicted on six substantive counts and the conspiracy count. The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case came to the Supreme Court on a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted because one of the questions presented involved a conflict between the decision below and United States v. Sall from the Third Circuit. The case had a complex procedural history involving a prior indictment for conspiracy alone that had been dismissed, following an earlier conviction that was reversed on appeal for errors in the charge.

(Douglas, J.)

Yes. A defendant can be convicted of substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when part of an ongoing conspiracy, even without direct participation in those specific offenses. The commission of substantive offenses and conspiracy to commit them are separate and distinct offenses. Congress has the power to separate the two and affix different penalties to each. A conviction for conspiracy may be obtained even though the substantive offense was completed, and double jeopardy is no defense to conviction for both offenses. The conspiracy and substantive offenses are not merged because conspiracy is a partnership in crime with ingredients and implications distinct from completion of the unlawful project. Conspiracy involves deliberate plotting to subvert laws, educating conspirators for further criminal practices, and is characterized by secrecy making detection difficult. In a continuous conspiracy, partners act for each other in carrying it forward. An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. When substantive offenses are committed by one conspirator in furtherance of the unlawful project, the criminal intent is established by formation of the conspiracy, and each conspirator instigated commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement contemplated precisely what was done, formed for that purpose, with acts done in execution of the enterprise. If an overt act can be supplied by one conspirator for conspiracy liability, the same or other acts in furtherance of conspiracy are attributable to others for holding them responsible for substantive offenses.

Dissent (Rutledge, J.) Daniel's conviction should be reversed as it violates both the letter and spirit of Congressional intent in separately defining three classes of crime: completed substantive offenses, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. The ruling either convicts one man for another's crime or punishes the same man twice for the same offense. Daniel was in the penitentiary when some of Walter's crimes were committed, with no evidence he participated, aided, abetted, or knew of the specific acts. The conviction creates vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as civil partnership liability, which is inappropriate for criminal law where guilt should remain personal, not vicarious. The effect either attributes Walter's guilt to Daniel or punishes Daniel twice for the same offense of agreeing to engage in crime. This creates a dangerous precedent that ignores Congressional distinctions between different types of criminal liability and essentially allows conviction for offenses not charged or proved against the defendant.