Does New York's justification statute require only a subjective belief by the defendant that deadly force was necessary, or does it also require an objective reasonableness standard?

On December 22, 1984, Bernhard Goetz boarded a subway train carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol. Four youths - Troy Canty, Darryl Cabey, James Ramseur, and Barry Allen - were also on the train, with two carrying screwdrivers they intended to use to break into video game coin boxes. When Canty approached Goetz and asked for five dollars, Goetz stood up and fired four shots in rapid succession, hitting all four youths. After briefly surveying the scene, he fired a fifth shot at Cabey, who was sitting on a bench, severing his spinal cord and leaving him paralyzed. Goetz then fled the scene. In subsequent statements to police, Goetz admitted his intent was to murder the youths and make them suffer as much as possible, stating he would have shot them repeatedly if he had more bullets. He explained he acted based on fear of being maimed, drawing from prior experiences including a 1981 mugging.

Goetz was initially charged with attempted murder and weapons possession. A first grand jury indicted him only on weapons charges, dismissing the attempted murder counts. The prosecution sought and received permission to present the case to a second grand jury, which returned a 10-count indictment including attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and weapons charges. Goetz moved to dismiss, arguing insufficient evidence and improper jury instructions on justification. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing all counts except reckless endangerment, finding the prosecutor erroneously instructed the grand jury to apply an objective reasonableness standard rather than a purely subjective test. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal in a divided decision, with the plurality agreeing that justification required only subjective belief. The prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeals.

(Wachtler, C.J.)

No. New York's justification statute requires both subjective belief and objective reasonableness. Penal Law § 35.15 permits the use of deadly force when a person "reasonably believes" such force is necessary to defend against imminent deadly force or certain felonies including robbery. The statute's use of "reasonably believes" rather than merely "believes" incorporates an objective standard requiring that the defendant's belief comport with what a reasonable person in the same circumstances could have believed.

The historical development of New York's self-defense law demonstrates consistent adherence to an objective reasonableness requirement. From the 1829 statute requiring "reasonable ground to apprehend" danger through the 1909 Penal Law, New York has never adopted a purely subjective standard. The Legislature's decision to add "reasonably" before "believes" in the current statute, rather than adopting the Model Penal Code's purely subjective "believes" standard, confirms the intent to retain objective reasonableness.

A purely subjective test would allow citizens to set their own standards for permissible force and could exonerate defendants with aberrational or delusional thought patterns, contrary to fundamental principles of justice. The objective standard does not ignore individual circumstances - it requires consideration of all relevant factors including the defendant's physical attributes, prior experiences, and knowledge of the persons involved. However, these personal circumstances must be evaluated against what a reasonable person in the defendant's situation could have believed.

The prosecutor's instruction to consider whether Goetz's conduct was that of "a reasonable man in the defendant's situation" was essentially accurate for grand jury purposes, which require less precision than petit jury instructions.