Does a state court have jurisdiction to enter a personal money judgment against a non-resident defendant who was served only by publication, was not personally served in the state, did not appear, and whose property was not attached or otherwise brought under the court's control at the commencement of the action?

J.H. Mitchell, an Oregon attorney, sued Neff in an Oregon state court to recover less than $300 for legal services. Neff was a non-resident of Oregon at the time. He was not personally served with process in Oregon and did not appear. Mitchell obtained an order allowing service by publication in a newspaper, supported by an affidavit as required by the Oregon Code. Neff did not answer, and the court entered a default judgment against him in February 1866 for less than $300, including costs.

Neff claimed a tract of land in Oregon, but the property was never attached or otherwise brought under the court's jurisdiction before the judgment. After the judgment, Mitchell obtained an execution, and the land was sold at a sheriff's sale to Pennoyer, who received a sheriff's deed. Neff asserted title to the land through a United States patent issued in 1866 under the Oregon Donation Law and sued Pennoyer in federal court to recover possession. The validity of the title turned on the validity of the earlier state court judgment.

Mitchell obtained a default judgment against Neff in an Oregon circuit court in February 1866 following service by publication. The land was sold on execution to Pennoyer. Neff then brought an action of ejectment against Pennoyer in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon to recover possession of the land. The Circuit Court ruled for Neff, holding that the underlying state court judgment was invalid because of defects in the affidavit supporting the order of publication and in the affidavit proving publication. Pennoyer brought a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment for Neff on different grounds.

(Field, J.)

No. A state court lacks jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against a non-resident who was not served with process within the state and did not appear, and the sale of his property under such a judgment is invalid.

The Court first rejected the Circuit Court's reasons. Defects in the affidavit for publication cannot be raised collaterally to impeach a judgment, and an affidavit by the newspaper's editor satisfies the statute requiring proof by the 'printer.' The judgment nonetheless fails for want of jurisdiction.

Two principles of public law govern. First, every state has exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. Second, no state can exercise direct jurisdiction over persons or property outside its territory. Process from one state's courts cannot run into another state, and publication cannot create an obligation on a non-resident to appear. Constructive service by publication therefore cannot support a purely in personam judgment against a non-resident.

A state may reach a non-resident's property within its borders to satisfy claims of its citizens, but that jurisdiction is incidental to its power over the property. The property must be attached or otherwise brought under the court's control at the outset of the action, making the proceeding in essence one in rem. Here, the land was not attached until the execution, after a personal judgment was rendered. Jurisdiction cannot depend on facts discovered after judgment, and a judgment void when rendered cannot become valid when property is later found. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870), and Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437 (1850), confirm this.

The Court further noted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, determining personal liability without jurisdiction over the defendant is not due process of law. It reserved cases involving status (such as divorce), consent to substituted service through an appointed agent, and corporations. The judgment was void, conferring no title on Pennoyer.

Dissent (Hunt, J.) The Court's ruling is at odds with long-established state practice, unsound in principle, and threatens to unsettle titles acquired under similar statutes for nearly a century. A sovereign state necessarily controls property within its limits and may subject it to debts owed to its citizens, regardless of the owner's non-residence. Personal notice is not indispensable; the legislature may authorize substituted service by publication and mailing if reasonably likely to inform the defendant and if an opportunity to defend is provided. Determining the mode of notice is a legislative matter, not subject to judicial override. Whether property is seized at the start of a suit by attachment or at its end by execution is a matter of municipal regulation, not constitutional power. Distinguishing the two is a refinement that depreciates a great general principle. The majority answered that jurisdiction must exist before judgment and cannot depend on facts found afterward.