Is an actress obligated to accept a role in a different film to mitigate damages after being wrongfully discharged from her original film production contract?

Shirley MacLaine Parker entered into a contract with Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation to star in a musical film titled 'Bloomer Girl' for a fee of $750,000. The film was to be produced in Los Angeles, and Parker's contract included rights of director and screenplay approval. Twentieth Century-Fox later decided not to produce 'Bloomer Girl' and instead offered Parker the lead role in a different film, 'Big Country, Big Man', for the same compensation. This alternative film was a dramatic western to be filmed in Australia. The new offer did not include Parker's previously agreed-upon rights of director and screenplay approval. Parker declined the offer for 'Big Country, Big Man' and subsequently filed a lawsuit against Twentieth Century-Fox, seeking the agreed-upon compensation from the original 'Bloomer Girl' contract.

Parker filed a lawsuit against Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation for breach of contract. She then moved for summary judgment in the trial court. The trial court granted Parker's motion, awarding her summary judgment for $750,000 plus interest. Following this decision, Twentieth Century-Fox appealed the case to the California Supreme Court.

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No. An actress is not obligated to accept a role in a different film to mitigate damages after being wrongfully discharged from her original film production contract. The duty to mitigate damages does not extend to accepting employment that is substantially different or inferior to the original contract. A wrongfully discharged employee must make reasonable efforts to seek other employment, but this obligation has clear limits. When the offered alternative employment differs significantly in nature, location, or terms, it falls outside the scope of required mitigation efforts. The change from a musical to a western drama, relocation of filming, and loss of creative control rights constitute material differences in employment. These differences fundamentally alter the nature of the work and the artist's role in the production. Requiring an actor to accept such divergent employment would improperly expand the mitigation doctrine beyond its intended scope. The reasonableness of refusing alternative employment is not a relevant consideration when the offered work is demonstrably different or inferior. This principle preserves the integrity of contractual agreements and protects employees from being forced into unsuitable positions after a breach by the employer. The mitigation doctrine aims to balance fairness between parties, not to compel wrongfully discharged employees to accept any available work regardless of its nature. Maintaining this distinction is crucial for protecting the rights and professional interests of employees in the entertainment industry and beyond.

Dissent (Sullivan, J.) The determination of whether the alternate employment was substantially similar or inferior should have been a factual issue for trial, not decided on summary judgment. It is not intuitively obvious that the leading female roles in a dramatic film and a musical comedy film are radically different, nor that the approval rights are highly significant. This approach potentially undermines the principle of mitigation of damages in employment contexts. The majority's decision on this matter as a matter of law is premature and overlooks important nuances that should be examined at trial.