Does a patient have a legal right to sue for conversion when researchers use their biological materials for commercial gain without obtaining informed consent?

John Moore received treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA Medical Center under the care of Dr. David W. Golde. Without Moore's knowledge or consent, Golde and other researchers used Moore's cells to develop a commercially valuable cell line, which they patented in 1984. The researchers entered into commercial agreements with biotechnology companies regarding this cell line, derived from Moore's T-lymphocytes. Moore made multiple visits to UCLA Medical Center between 1976 and 1983, allegedly under the false pretense that these visits were necessary for his health. In reality, these visits were orchestrated to obtain more of Moore's cells for research purposes.

The defendants did not inform Moore of their activities involving his cells or seek his consent for their commercial use. The patented cell line held significant commercial potential, but Moore remained unaware of its existence and the financial arrangements surrounding it. This situation led to legal action by Moore against Golde and other parties involved in the unauthorized use and commercialization of his cellular material.

Moore filed a lawsuit against Golde, the Regents of the University of California, Shirley G. Quan, Genetics Institute, Inc., and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation. The superior court sustained demurrers to Moore's third amended complaint, effectively dismissing the case. Moore then appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's ruling, holding that the complaint did state a cause of action for conversion. Following this reversal, the case was elevated to the California Supreme Court for further review.

(Panelli, J.)

No. A patient does not have a legal right to sue for conversion when researchers use their biological materials for commercial gain without obtaining informed consent. The law does not recognize an ownership interest in cells once they are removed from the body. Existing statutory regulations govern the use of human biological materials, and these regulations do not confer property rights to the source of those materials. The subject of patents derived from research on human cells is legally and factually distinct from the cells themselves. Recognizing a conversion cause of action in this context would significantly impede medical research by creating uncertainty in the chain of title to biological materials. This could potentially chill scientific progress and the development of new treatments.

However, patients are not without legal recourse. The law recognizes causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent against physicians who fail to disclose preexisting research and economic interests in a patient's cells before obtaining consent for medical procedures. This approach balances the need to protect patients' rights with the societal interest in advancing medical research. It places the onus on healthcare providers to be transparent about potential conflicts of interest and secondary uses of biological materials, without granting patients an ongoing property interest in their excised cells or tissues. This legal framework preserves the ability of researchers to access and use biological materials for scientific advancement while still holding medical professionals accountable for their ethical obligations to patients.

Concurrence (Arabian, J.) The majority opinion is correct in its legal analysis. However, we must not overlook the profound moral and philosophical implications of treating human tissues as commodities. This case raises fundamental questions about the nature of property rights in one's own body and the ethical boundaries of medical research. We must carefully consider the potential consequences of allowing individuals to profit from their own biological materials, while also ensuring that scientific progress is not unduly hindered.

Concurrence/Dissent (Broussard, J.) I concur with the majority's decision regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, I strongly disagree with the rejection of Moore's conversion claim. Moore should have a cause of action for conversion based on his right to control the use of his cells before their removal. The majority's decision fails to adequately protect patients' interests in their own bodily tissues and may lead to exploitation in medical research. A limited property right in one's cells would not impede scientific progress but would ensure proper informed consent and fair compensation.

Dissent (Mosk, J.) The majority's analysis of property rights in human tissues is fundamentally flawed and fails to protect patients' interests. Moore should have a cause of action for conversion. The decision today unjustly deprives individuals of control over their own bodily materials and creates a dangerous precedent that may lead to exploitation in medical research. The majority's concerns about impeding scientific progress are overstated and do not justify denying patients basic property rights in their own cells. This ruling undermines principles of informed consent and personal autonomy in medical decision-making.