Can a city's housing ordinance that narrowly defines 'family' and restricts dwelling occupancy to single families violate constitutional due process protections?

Inez Moore, a homeowner in East Cleveland, Ohio, resided in her house with her son and two grandsons who were first cousins. One grandson, John, moved in with Moore following his mother's death. East Cleveland's housing ordinance narrowly defined 'family,' permitting only specific categories of related individuals to cohabitate. Moore's living arrangement violated this ordinance. In early 1973, the city issued Moore a notice of violation, instructing her to comply with the ordinance. When Moore failed to remove her grandson John from her home, the city filed criminal charges against her. Moore was subsequently convicted, sentenced to five days in jail, and fined $25.

Mrs. Moore was charged under a local ordinance. She filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the ordinance's constitutionality on its face. The trial court overruled her motion and subsequently convicted her. Mrs. Moore appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which affirmed her conviction after reviewing her constitutional arguments. She then sought review from the Ohio Supreme Court, but her request was denied. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal, agreeing to hear the case.

(Powell, J.)

Yes. A city's housing ordinance that narrowly defines 'family' and restricts dwelling occupancy to single families can violate constitutional due process protections. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects choices concerning family living arrangements. The right to live together as a family is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition, and the Constitution safeguards the sanctity of the family. Intrusion into this fundamental right requires substantial justification, which was not present in this case. The city's purported goals of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic congestion, and avoiding undue financial burden on schools were insufficient to justify the significant interference with family rights. The ordinance only marginally served these objectives while substantially infringing upon protected liberties. This case is distinguishable from precedents involving restrictions on unrelated individuals living together, as it regulates within the family unit itself. The Constitution prevents the government from standardizing its children and its adults by forcing them into a particular family living pattern. The choice of relatives to live together is not one that government can prescribe without substantial justification. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents sharing a household with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition as those of the nuclear family. By slicing deeply into the family itself, the ordinance violates the fundamental right to family integrity protected by the Due Process Clause.

Concurrence (Brennan, J.) The ordinance displays cultural myopia and insensitivity to the economic and emotional needs of a large part of society, particularly in relation to extended families in minority communities. This narrow view fails to recognize the diverse family structures that exist and contribute to the fabric of our society. The government's intrusion into family living arrangements must be scrutinized carefully, considering the importance of the interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.

Concurrence (Stevens, J.) The right of a property owner to determine the internal composition of her household is fundamental. The ordinance has not been shown to have any substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. As such, it constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just compensation. This decision upholds the principle that government intrusion into private living arrangements must be justified by compelling state interests.

Dissent (Burger, C.J.) Mrs. Moore should be denied a hearing because she failed to seek discretionary administrative relief in the form of a variance. The importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial review cannot be overstated. This principle ensures that administrative bodies have the opportunity to address issues within their expertise before courts intervene.

Dissent (Stewart, J.) The ordinance does not violate any constitutionally protected rights of association or privacy. The interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren does not rise to the level of a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court should exercise restraint in expanding the scope of fundamental rights beyond those explicitly recognized in the Constitution.

Dissent (White, J.) While Mrs. Moore's interest qualifies as a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the demands of the Clause are satisfied once the Court is assured that the challenged proscription is the product of a duly enacted or promulgated statute, ordinance, or regulation and that it is not wholly lacking in purpose or utility. The Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in matters of social policy.