Does the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bar the prosecution from using statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, obtained from a suspect during custodial police interrogation unless the suspect was first warned of the right to remain silent, that statements may be used against him, and the right to retained or appointed counsel, and knowingly and intelligently waived those rights?

Four consolidated cases involved defendants who gave incriminating statements to police during custodial interrogation without being fully and effectively warned of their constitutional rights. Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his Phoenix home, identified by the complaining witness, and questioned for two hours in an interrogation room by two officers who admitted they never told him he could have an attorney present. He signed a written confession containing a typed clause reciting "full knowledge" of his legal rights. Michael Vignera orally admitted a Brooklyn dress shop robbery to a detective, was later questioned by an assistant district attorney, and nothing indicated any warnings were given. Carl Westover was held and interrogated by Kansas City police for over 14 hours without any warnings in the record, then immediately questioned by FBI agents in the same police station, who gave warnings at the outset and obtained signed confessions to two California robberies. Roy Stewart was held five days and interrogated nine times by Los Angeles police before admitting a robbery in which a victim died; the record showed no warnings.

Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape in an Arizona trial court and sentenced to 20 to 30 years on each count. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing that he never requested counsel. Vignera was convicted of first degree robbery in New York, adjudged a third-felony offender, and sentenced to 30 to 60 years. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Westover was convicted in federal court of the California robberies, sentenced to 15 years on each count consecutively, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first degree murder in California and sentenced to death, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding under Escobedo that he should have been advised of his rights and refusing to presume warnings from a silent record. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all four cases and consolidated them for argument.

(Warren, J.)

Yes. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.

The Fifth Amendment privilege applies outside criminal courtrooms and protects persons in any setting where their freedom of action is significantly curtailed. Incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere contains inherently compelling pressures that undermine the will to resist, as shown by police interrogation manuals that advise isolating the suspect, projecting certainty of guilt, minimizing the offense, and using trickery and persistence. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), had already tied the confession standard to the Fifth Amendment, and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), applied the privilege to the States.

Unless other fully effective means are devised, the suspect must be warned before any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford one, one will be appointed. The warnings are an absolute prerequisite; the Court will not inquire whether a particular defendant already knew his rights. Counsel's presence is needed to dispel the compulsion of the setting, and the right does not depend on a request, since the defendant who most needs counsel may be the one who does not know to ask.

If the suspect indicates in any manner at any time that he wishes to remain silent, questioning must cease; if he requests an attorney, questioning must cease until counsel is present. A waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The government bears a heavy burden to prove waiver, and waiver is not presumed from silence or from the fact that a confession was eventually obtained. Lengthy interrogation or incommunicado detention before a statement is strong evidence of no valid waiver. No distinction exists between confessions, admissions, and exculpatory statements. Volunteered statements and general on-the-scene questioning are unaffected, and Congress and the States remain free to devise equally effective alternatives.

Applied here, Miranda received no warnings, and the typed "full knowledge" clause did not establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. Vignera received no warnings or other protections. Westover's confession followed more than 14 hours of continuous interrogation, so the FBI's later warnings came, from his standpoint, at the end of the process and did not support waiver. In Stewart, a silent record on warnings cannot support a presumption of warnings or waiver, and five days of persistent questioning compelled him to forgo the privilege. The judgments in Nos. 759, 760, and 761 are reversed; the California judgment in No. 584 is affirmed.

Dissent in Nos. 759, 760, 761, concurring in the result in No. 584 (Clark, J.) The majority goes too far on too little. The police manuals it cites are academic and individual writings not shown to be any department's official manual, and the brutality examples are rare exceptions. The majority answered that these texts are used by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides, and that the brutality examples are the exception now but are widespread enough to be a concern. The Court admits the statements here might not be involuntary in traditional terms, and it fashions a rigid rule far beyond Escobedo without empirical knowledge of its operation. The proper course is the traditional totality-of-circumstances due process test, with the State bearing the burden of proving waiver or voluntariness where counsel warnings were not given. He would affirm Miranda, Vignera, and Westover, and in Stewart would dismiss the writ for want of a final judgment or, on the merits, affirm.

Dissent (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., and White, J.) The decision is poor constitutional law with harmful consequences. The Due Process voluntariness test, refined over 25 years of cases, is a workable and flexible means of policing confessions. Historically the privilege against self-incrimination did not govern extra-legal confessions, and Fifth Amendment precedent does not require warnings, elimination of all pressure, or counsel; the new rules are actually borrowed from Sixth Amendment trial-stage cases that are inapposite to the station house. As policy the rules are unsupported: they do not prevent blatant coercion by officers prepared to lie, but they will sharply reduce confessions, a long-accepted law enforcement tool, and no State urged them. Foreign and FBI practices are less rigid than portrayed. Major study efforts and legislative reform are underway, and the Court's decision will handicap them. He would adhere to the due process test and affirm Miranda and Vignera, dismiss or reverse in Stewart, and affirm Westover.

Dissent (White, J., joined by Harlan, J., and Stewart, J.) Neither the language nor the history of the Fifth Amendment supports a rule forbidding custodial interrogation without prescribed warnings and waiver; the privilege historically applied only to compelled judicial testimony, and prior cases from Hopt through Crooker and Cicenia treated confessions under a voluntariness standard. The majority makes new law without empirical support, extrapolating from police manuals and never examining a transcript of the interrogations before it. Custodial questioning is not inherently coercive, and a presumption that the first answer to the first question is compelled is irrational, as is treating exculpatory statements as coerced. The rule in effect creates a Fifth Amendment right to counsel and makes counsel the arbiter of the privilege. It rests on distrust of all confessions and will release dangerous criminals, weaken deterrence, slow the clearing of innocent suspects, and sacrifice society's security. He would affirm in Nos. 759, 760, and 761 and reverse in No. 584.