Does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require that a recipient of Social Security disability benefits be afforded an evidentiary hearing before those benefits are terminated?

Respondent Eldridge was first awarded Social Security disability benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, a state agency monitoring his condition sent him a questionnaire, which he completed, stating that his condition had not improved and identifying his treating sources. The agency obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant, then sent him a letter stating a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter gave its reasons and advised that he could submit additional information. Eldridge responded in writing, disputing one characterization of his condition and asserting that the agency already had enough evidence of his disability. The state agency made its final determination that his disability had ceased, and the Social Security Administration (SSA) accepted it and notified him in July that benefits would end after that month. The notice informed him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months. Eldridge did not seek reconsideration and instead sued, challenging the constitutionality of the administrative procedures for determining continuing disability and seeking reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing.

Eldridge filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia challenging the termination procedures. The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that the termination followed valid regulations and that Eldridge failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Relying on Goldberg v. Kelly, the District Court held that the procedures violated procedural due process, ordered Eldridge's benefits reinstated pending final disposition, and concluded that he was entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries. 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying entirely on the District Court's opinion, affirmed the injunction barring termination before an evidentiary hearing. 493 F.2d 1230 (1974). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

(Powell, J.)

No. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits; the existing administrative procedures satisfy due process.

Jurisdiction was proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Eldridge presented his claim for continued benefits to the Secretary, satisfying the nonwaivable element of finality. The exhaustion element could be treated as satisfied because his constitutional challenge was collateral to his benefits claim and rested on the contention that an erroneous termination could cause harm not remediable by retroactive payments.

On the merits, benefits are a statutorily created property interest, and due process is flexible, calling for the procedural protections the situation demands. Identifying what process is due requires weighing three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional procedures.

First, the private interest is weaker than in Goldberg because disability benefits are not based on financial need, recipients receive full retroactive payments if they prevail, and other forms of assistance may be available. Second, the risk of error is lower and the value of an evidentiary hearing is less. The inquiry turns on a medical assessment based on written reports by physicians who have examined the recipient, not on witness credibility. The recipient can respond in writing, review the evidence, and challenge the agency's tentative conclusion before the cutoff. Reversal-rate statistics are not controlling. Third, requiring pretermination evidentiary hearings in all cases would impose substantial fiscal and administrative burdens.

Substantial weight is given to the good-faith judgments of the officials Congress charged with administering the program that the procedures assure fair consideration of claims, particularly because a full evidentiary hearing and judicial review are available before the denial becomes final. The Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed.

Dissent (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.) For the reasons stated in his dissent in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972), prior to termination of benefits Eldridge must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Goldberg v. Kelly. The majority's reliance on the limited deprivation caused by discontinuing disability benefits is speculative. Congress's decision to provide disability benefits without a need determination presumes a need by the recipient that the Court should not denigrate. Here the termination led to foreclosure on Eldridge's home and repossession of the family's furniture, forcing the family to sleep in one bed. That a worker denied disability benefits may seek other public assistance is no answer. The majority replied that other government assistance becomes available if termination pushes a worker or family below subsistence, so there is less reason than in Goldberg to require an evidentiary hearing.