Does a nonmarital partner who lived with another for years without marrying state a cause of action to enforce an express or implied agreement to share property and receive support, notwithstanding the nonmarital nature of the relationship?

Michelle Marvin (plaintiff) and Lee Marvin (defendant) lived together from October 1964 through May 1970 without marrying. Michelle alleged that in October 1964 they orally agreed to combine their efforts and earnings and share equally all property accumulated during their time together, to hold themselves out as husband and wife, and that she would serve as his companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. She alleged she gave up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer to devote her full time to Lee, and that Lee agreed to provide for all her financial support and needs for the rest of her life. During the relationship, substantial real and personal property was acquired in Lee's name, including motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, Lee compelled Michelle to leave his household. He continued to support her until November 1971 and then stopped. Lee's marriage to Betty Marvin did not end until a final divorce decree was filed in January 1967. Michelle sought declaratory relief determining her contract and property rights and the imposition of a constructive trust on half the property acquired during the relationship.

Michelle filed a complaint asserting two causes of action: declaratory relief and imposition of a constructive trust. Lee's demurrer was overruled, and he answered. After extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. On the day set for trial, the trial court denied Michelle leave to file an amended complaint adding two causes of action against a nonparty corporation. Lee then moved to dismiss, which the trial court treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings augmented by the stipulation concerning the date of Lee's divorce. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for Lee. The court denied Michelle's motion to set aside the judgment and for leave to amend to allege that the parties reaffirmed their agreement after Lee's divorce became final. Michelle appealed from the judgment.

(Tobriner, J.)

Yes. Adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. The complaint states a cause of action for breach of express contract and can be amended to state causes of action based on implied contract or equitable relief, so judgment on the pleadings was error.

Express contracts between nonmarital partners are enforceable unless they explicitly and inseparably rest on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698 (1932), Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal.2d 681 (1943), and the Court of Appeal cases following them establish that a contract fails only to the extent it rests on illicit sexual consideration. Tests asking whether an agreement is 'involved in' or made 'in contemplation of' a nonmarital relationship are vague and unworkable, because virtually every such agreement would fail them. The alleged agreement to pool earnings, share property, and provide support rests on no unlawful consideration.

Defendant's other arguments fail. An improper transfer of community property is voidable at the instance of the aggrieved spouse, not void, and Betty Marvin's rights were fixed by the divorce decrees. Civil Code section 5134 governs marriage settlements and does not apply, and section 43.5(d) bars only actions for breach of promise of marriage.

In the absence of an express agreement, courts may inquire into the parties' conduct to find an implied contract, implied partnership or joint venture, or other tacit understanding. They may also apply constructive or resulting trusts, and a partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services less the reasonable value of support received, if services were rendered with the expectation of monetary reward. The prior rule denying such remedies was inconsistent: it enforced express contracts, protected monetary contributions, and gave remedies to putative spouses, yet denied relief for services. 'Guilt' cannot justify an unequal division between equally 'guilty' persons, and changed social mores bar treating such relationships as meretricious.

The Family Law Act does not govern property rights of nonmarital partners, so In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App.3d 345 (1973), erred to the extent it held otherwise. No common law marriage is revived. The judgment is reversed and remanded.

Concurrence in part and dissent in part (Clark, J.) The majority properly permits recovery on express or implied-in-fact agreement, and that resolution requires reversal, so the opinion should stop there. The court should not attempt to determine all rights, duties, and remedies within every meretricious relationship in vague terms, and should decide those issues in concrete cases. The majority does not say when equitable and quantum meruit recovery is available, what limits apply, or whether the remedies are cumulative. It leaves open whether the court may create an equal division rule when the Legislature excluded some such parties from Civil Code section 4452, whether imposing spousal obligations is equitable on parties who may have avoided marriage to escape them, whether examining conduct violates the Family Law Act's no-fault spirit, whether trial courts will bear an unmanageable burden of arbitrating domestic disputes, and whether quantum meruit would place meretricious partners in a better position than lawful spouses. By judicial overreach, the majority performs a nunc pro tunc marriage, dissolves it, and distributes its property on terms never contemplated by the parties, case law, or the Legislature. (The majority answers that it does not revive common law marriage, does not hold the parties married, and does not extend Family Law Act spousal rights to them.)