Does the unexcused violation of a statute requiring lights on a vehicle constitute negligence in itself, such that a trial court errs by instructing the jury that the absence of lights is merely some evidence of negligence it may weigh as lightly or gravely as it chooses?

On the night of August 21, 1915, the plaintiff and her husband were driving a buggy toward Tarrytown on a public highway when it was struck by the defendant's automobile traveling in the opposite direction. Both were thrown to the ground, and the husband was killed. The collision occurred at a curve in the road. The defendant claimed the buggy emerged suddenly from the gloom, and the beam of his headlamps pointed to the right as his car turned left along the curve. The plaintiff charged the defendant with negligence for failing to keep to the right of the center of the highway under the Highway Law. The defendant charged the husband with contributory negligence for driving the buggy without lights, as required by the Highway Law. There was no evidence of excessive speed or defective equipment on the defendant's car. The parties tried the case on the assumption that the hour had arrived when lights were required. The plaintiff contended the scene was illuminated by moonlight, an electric lamp, and the lights of the approaching car.

The case was tried before a jury, which found the defendant negligent and the plaintiff's intestate free of contributory negligence, and rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed the judgment on the law and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court's charge on the effect of the missing lights was erroneous. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals on a stipulation that judgment absolute would be entered for the defendant if the order were affirmed.

(Cardozo, J.)

Yes. The unexcused omission of the statutory lights is negligence in itself, and the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it was only some evidence of negligence that they could treat as lightly or gravely as they wished.

Lights are required for the guidance and protection of other travelers on the highway. To omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another is to fall short of the standard of diligence that those living in organized society owe. This is the established rule in New York. Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531; Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N.Y. 74. Jurors have no dispensing power to relax the duty one traveler owes another under a statute. Allowing them to treat the violation as innocent or culpable at their discretion is as erroneous as allowing them to excuse a master's omission of a statutory safety appliance for a workman.

Negligence must be distinguished from causal connection. Statutory negligence does not defeat recovery unless the missing lights were at least a contributing cause of the collision. A collision more than an hour after sundown between a car and an unseen, unlighted buggy permits an inference of causal connection. If nothing else breaks the connection, the omission is prima facie evidence of contributory negligence. The plaintiff may rebut this by proving that other illumination made lights on the wagon superfluous, but the jury was not required to find that. The jury should have been told that the omission was negligence and prima facie evidence of contributory negligence, sufficient unless overcome to sustain a verdict that the decedent was at fault. The charge minimized the gravity of the decedent's fault, so the Appellate Division's order is affirmed.

Dissent (Hogan, J.) The jury and the Appellate Division determined the facts in the plaintiff's favor: the defendant drove on the wrong side of the road, the plaintiff's buggy stayed on the extreme right, and the highway was adequately lit. The refused request to charge was an abstract proposition that omitted the essential requirement that contributory negligence be the proximate cause of the injury. The trial court properly charged proximate cause and instructed that any contributory negligence, however slight, required a defense verdict. The jury found the accident happened as the plaintiff claimed, and it may not be inferred that a light on the wagon would have prevented the collision. The majority answers that a nighttime collision with an unseen, unlit buggy permits an inference of causal connection, making the omission prima facie contributory negligence. The majority substitutes form and phrases for substance and departs from the rule of causal connection established in Willy v. Mulledy and Briggs v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R. Co.