Does the manufacturer of a finished automobile owe a duty of care, independent of contract, to a subpurchaser injured by a defective wheel that reasonable inspection would have revealed?

Buick Motor Co. (defendant) manufactured automobiles and sold one to a retail dealer, who resold it to MacPherson (plaintiff). While MacPherson was riding in the car, a wheel collapsed, throwing him out and injuring him. The wheel was made of defective wood and its spokes crumbled into fragments. Buick did not make the wheel; it purchased it ready-made from the Imperial Wheel Company, a reputable manufacturer that had supplied Buick with eighty thousand wheels, none of which had previously proved defective. Buick relied on the wheel manufacturer to test the material and performed no tests itself. Evidence showed that a reasonable inspection would have discovered the defect and that no inspection was made. The car was being prudently operated at a low speed when the wheel failed. There was no claim that Buick knew of the defect or concealed it, and no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. MacPherson sued for negligence, not breach of contract.

MacPherson sued Buick Motor Co. for negligence in the trial court and obtained a verdict after the jury was instructed that an automobile is not inherently dangerous but may become imminently dangerous if equipped with a weak wheel, and that Buick was chargeable with the defect to the extent reasonable inspection and tests would have revealed it. The Appellate Division approved the trial court's rulings. Buick appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

(Cardozo, J.)

Yes. A manufacturer of a finished product that is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made owes a duty of care to foreseeable users, independent of contract.

Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), established that a manufacturer owes a duty to those beyond the immediate purchaser when negligence puts human life in imminent danger. That principle is not confined to poisons, explosives, and weapons, things whose normal function is to injure or destroy. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882), applied it to a scaffold, and Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478 (1909), applied it to a coffee urn. Neither is inherently destructive; each becomes dangerous only if negligently made.

The governing rule: if the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is a thing of danger. If the manufacturer also knows that persons other than the purchaser will use it without new tests, the manufacturer must make it carefully. The danger must be probable, not merely possible, and the relationship between manufacturer and user must not be too remote. The duty arises from the law, not from contract.

Applied here, an automobile built to travel fifty miles an hour is probably dangerous if its wheels are defective. Buick knew the car would be used by persons other than the dealer, since the dealer bought to resell and the car seated three. Buick, as manufacturer of the finished product, could not escape its duty of inspection by buying wheels from a reputable maker. It was required to subject component parts to ordinary and simple tests before placing the car on the market, and the evidence showed that reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect. Whether liability extends back to component-part manufacturers is left open. The judgment is affirmed.

Dissent (Bartlett, Ch. J.) The ruling extends a vendor's liability further than any prior decision of the court. Under settled law, a vendor of a manufactured article is liable for negligence only to the immediate vendee, subject to a narrow exception for inherently dangerous articles such as poisons and explosives. The trial court itself instructed that an automobile is not inherently dangerous, and a defective wheel on a car moving eight miles an hour is no more dangerous than a defective wheel on a horse-drawn carriage, for which no liability to strangers to the sale exists. The majority answered that the instruction only meant danger is not expected when a car is well built, and that the case does not turn on whether a thing is called inherently or imminently dangerous. Upholding the judgment requires overruling Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, Thomas v. Winchester, and the many authorities, including Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, Earl v. Lubbock, and Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801, that adhere to the privity rule. If the rule is to change because it is archaic as applied to automobiles, the legislature, not the courts, should make that change.