Do environmental groups have legal standing to contest a regulation that limits the Endangered Species Act's reach to U.S. territory and international waters?

Environmental organizations, led by Defenders of Wildlife, challenged a regulation interpreting Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The regulation limited the Act's application to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The plaintiffs contended this interpretation was overly narrow, arguing the Act should encompass U.S.-funded projects in foreign countries. They cited examples such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka as potentially threatening endangered species. Two Defenders of Wildlife members, Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, provided affidavits stating they had previously visited the areas in question and planned to return, claiming potential harm from lost opportunities to observe endangered species.

The case progressed through the legal system, with lower courts initially ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. It subsequently reached the Supreme Court for final adjudication on the scope and application of the Endangered Species Act to U.S.-funded projects abroad.

Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental groups filed suit against the Secretary in federal district court. The district court initially dismissed the case for lack of standing. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the district court's dismissal.

Upon remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the issue of standing, which the district court denied. The district court then granted the plaintiffs' motion on the merits and ordered the Secretary to publish a revised regulation.

The Secretary appealed this decision to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling. Following this affirmation, the Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.

(Scalia, J.)

No. Environmental groups lack legal standing to contest regulations limiting the Endangered Species Act's reach to U.S. territory and international waters. Standing requires concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury. Mere intentions to visit project areas "someday" are insufficient to establish imminent harm. Theories of "ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus," and "vocational nexus" do not provide a basis for standing. The injury-in-fact test demands more than a general interest in the subject matter; plaintiffs must demonstrate direct, personal impact beyond their special interest. Furthermore, redressability is not established when it remains uncertain whether a favorable ruling would prevent harm to the species in question. This is especially true when the agencies funding the foreign projects are not parties to the case and U.S. agencies only partially fund the projects. The requirement for standing serves to ensure that courts adjudicate actual cases or controversies rather than abstract policy disputes. It maintains the separation of powers by preventing the judiciary from encroaching on the policymaking functions of the other branches. Allowing standing based on generalized grievances or speculative future injuries would improperly expand judicial power and potentially flood the courts with ideologically-motivated lawsuits lacking concrete disputes. The stringent standing requirements thus preserve the integrity of the judicial process and ensure that courts resolve only those disputes where plaintiffs have a genuine, personal stake in the outcome.

Concurrence (Kennedy, J.) Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. However, Congress must at least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. This requirement ensures that the legislative branch respects the separation of powers and the unique role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution.

Concurrence/Dissent (Stevens, J.) The plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient standing to bring this case. However, I agree with the judgment because Section 7(a)(2) does not apply to activities in foreign countries. This interpretation limits the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws while still recognizing the plaintiffs' right to challenge domestic actions that may have international consequences.

Dissent (Blackmun, J.) The plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient injury and redressability for standing. The majority's approach is overly restrictive and imposes fresh limitations on Congress's authority to allow citizen suits. This decision undermines the legislative intent behind environmental protection laws and may hinder future efforts to address global environmental concerns through the judicial system. The Court should adopt a more flexible approach to standing that recognizes the interconnected nature of environmental harms and the importance of citizen enforcement.