Do plaintiff wildlife-conservation organizations have Article III standing to challenge a regulation limiting the Endangered Species Act's interagency consultation requirement to actions in the United States or on the high seas, where their members assert only an intent to someday revisit foreign project sites and a congressional citizen-suit provision purports to confer a right to compliance with the consultation procedure?

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires each federal agency, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to ensure that actions it funds or carries out do not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their critical habitat. In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation extending this duty to actions in foreign nations. The Interior Department later reconsidered, and a revised regulation promulgated in 1986 limited the consultation requirement to actions taken in the United States or on the high seas.

Defenders of Wildlife and other conservation organizations sued the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaration that the new regulation misstated the geographic scope of the consultation duty and an injunction requiring a regulation restoring the original interpretation. To show injury, they relied on affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had visited Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return; she asserted harm from American involvement in rehabilitating the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had visited Sri Lanka in 1981, did not see the endangered Asian elephant or leopard, and intended to return; she asserted harm from the AID-funded Mahaweli project. At deposition, Skilbred had no current plans to return and said she did not know when she would. The funding agencies were not parties, and AID supplied less than 10% of the Mahaweli project's funding.

Respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Eighth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. On remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on standing and respondents moved for summary judgment on the merits. The district court denied the Secretary's motion, reasoning that the Eighth Circuit had already decided standing, granted respondents' merits motion, and ordered the Secretary to publish a revised regulation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

(Scalia, J.)

No. Respondents lack Article III standing, and the Court reverses the Eighth Circuit and remands. Parts I, II, III-A, and IV command a majority of six Justices; Part III-B (redressability) is a plurality opinion joined by four Justices.

Standing is an essential part of the case-or-controversy requirement. A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. The plaintiff bears the burden of supporting each element with the evidence required at the successive stages of litigation, so at summary judgment the plaintiff must set forth specific facts by affidavit or other evidence. Where, as here, the plaintiff is not the object of the government action and the injury turns on the regulation of third parties, standing is substantially more difficult to establish.

Injury (Part III-A, majority). The desire to observe an animal species is a cognizable interest, but the plaintiff must be among the injured. Kelly and Skilbred showed past visits and an intent to return someday, without concrete plans or any date. Past exposure does not establish a present controversy (Los Angeles v. Lyons), and such some-day intentions do not show actual or imminent injury. The "ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus," and "vocational nexus" theories fail. Under Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, a plaintiff must use the area affected by the challenged activity, not an area roughly in its vicinity. Allowing anyone who views or works with an endangered species anywhere in the world to sue is speculation, not a showing of perceptible harm.

Redressability (Part III-B, plurality of four). The funding agencies were not parties, and an order against the Secretary would not bind them, since the agencies disputed the Secretary's authority and the Solicitor General repudiated his position that the regulation binds them. Because agencies often supply only a fraction of project funding, it is also conjectural whether the projects would change.

Procedural injury (Part IV, majority). The citizen-suit provision cannot supply standing. A plaintiff asserting only a generalized grievance in having the government follow the law, with relief that benefits him no more than the public, presents no Article III case. Congress may elevate concrete de facto injuries to legally cognizable status, but it cannot convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive compliance with the law into an individual right enforceable by anyone, because that would transfer the President's duty under Art. II, § 3 to the courts. A procedural right can be asserted only to protect some concrete interest of the plaintiff.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J.) Kelly and Skilbred have not shown that they are themselves among the injured, since it is not reasonable to assume they will use the sites regularly and they claim no visits since the projects began. The nexus theories fail on this record, but a similar theory might support standing in different circumstances (Japan Whaling Assn.). Because injury is lacking, redressability need not be reached. Congress has power to define injuries and chains of causation that create cases or controversies, but it must identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate it to the class of persons entitled to sue. The ESA citizen-suit provision does not do so. The concrete-injury requirement preserves the adversarial process and confines the judiciary to its proper role.

Concurring in the judgment (Stevens, J.) Respondents have standing. The imminence of injury to an interest in observing a species should be measured by the timing and likelihood of the threatened environmental harm, not by when the plaintiff would next visit. The injury occurs when the species is destroyed, and Kelly's and Skilbred's past visits, professional backgrounds, and affidavits suffice to show genuine interest. Redressability is also satisfied because agencies must be presumed to follow this Court's authoritative construction of the statute. Stevens nonetheless concurs in the judgment because the presumption against extraterritoriality, the absence of any textual reference to foreign activity, the provisions of ESA §§ 8 and 9 that specifically address foreign species, and the domestic focus of the congressional findings show that § 7(a)(2) does not apply to activities in foreign countries.

Dissent (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.) Respondents raised genuine issues of material fact on injury and redressability sufficient to survive summary judgment, and the majority confused the Rule 56(e) evidentiary burden with the Rule 56(c) "genuine issue" standard. A reasonable factfinder could infer from past visits and professional backgrounds that Kelly and Skilbred would return, and demanding concrete travel plans is an empty formality. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation is misread; environmental harm can reach distant plaintiffs. On redressability, the Secretary has publicly and in this litigation treated his consultation regulations as binding, the action agencies participated in the suit and are bound by collateral estoppel, and the record shows AID's funding ($170 million) can influence Sri Lanka's mitigation efforts. As to procedural injuries, the Court's broad language threatens Congress's power to structure Executive action through action-forcing procedures like consultation, which protect concrete interests. The majority answers that it does not bar enforcement of procedures tied to a plaintiff's own concrete interest, and that the dissent cites no case finding standing on a procedural right alone.