Does a state law banning interracial marriage violate constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment?

In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, a Black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, both Virginia residents, married in Washington D.C. They returned to Virginia and established their home in Caroline County. In October 1958, they were indicted for violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty and received a one-year jail sentence, suspended for 25 years on the condition they leave Virginia.

The Lovings relocated to D.C. but subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence. Their motion argued that Virginia's antimiscegenation statutes were unconstitutional. This legal action challenged the state's laws prohibiting interracial marriage and set the stage for a constitutional review of such statutes.

The Lovings pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Caroline County, Virginia. They subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment in the state trial court. When this motion remained undecided, the Lovings initiated a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on October 28, 1964. The state trial judge denied their motion to vacate on January 22, 1965. The Lovings then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation statutes. Following this decision, the Lovings appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966.

(Warren, C.J.)

Yes. A state law banning interracial marriage violates constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such laws draw distinctions based solely on race, violating the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate all official sources of invidious racial discrimination. The freedom to marry is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. Restricting this freedom on the basis of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. There is no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination that justifies such a classification. The Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially in statutes concerning the intimate relation of marriage, be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny. The fact that Virginia's antimiscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the non-white participants in an interracial marriage does not mitigate the unconstitutionality of the classification. The statutes' racial classifications are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the integrity of all races. The freedom of choice to marry resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State simply on the basis of racial classifications. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.

Concurrence (Stewart, J.) It is not possible for a state law to be valid under the Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor. This principle extends beyond the specific case at hand and establishes a clear constitutional standard against racial discrimination in criminal statutes. The Virginia law in question violates this fundamental principle and is therefore unconstitutional.