Is a state law criminalizing private, consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment?

John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were arrested in Lawrence's private apartment in Houston, Texas, for engaging in consensual sexual conduct. The arrest occurred when police officers, responding to a reported weapons disturbance, entered the apartment and observed the two men involved in a sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were subsequently charged under Texas Penal Code § 21.06(a), which specifically criminalized "deviate sexual intercourse" between individuals of the same sex.

Following their arrest, Lawrence and Garner were convicted under the Texas statute. As a result of their conviction, they were required to pay fines and were assessed court costs. The case directly challenged the constitutionality of the Texas law criminalizing intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same sex in private settings.

Lawrence and Garner were initially convicted before a Justice of the Peace. They then exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. At this trial, they challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Texas Constitution. The court rejected these arguments, and Lawrence and Garner entered a plea of nolo contendere. Following this, the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District affirmed the convictions. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

(Kennedy, J.)

No. A state law criminalizing private, consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. This fundamental right to liberty encompasses the freedom of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct without government intrusion. The criminalization of such behavior infringes upon this liberty interest without a legitimate state interest to justify the intrusion into the personal and private life of individuals.

The principles of personal autonomy, privacy, and liberty protected by the Due Process Clause extend to intimate choices made by both married and unmarried persons. These principles have evolved alongside societal understanding of liberty and equality. Historical and traditional values alone cannot justify laws that infringe on fundamental rights. The right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.

There is no legitimate state interest that can overcome the individual's right to make intimate and personal choices free from government interference. Laws targeting same-sex conduct do not further any important governmental interest. They instead demean the lives of homosexual persons and impinge on their right to seek autonomy in their personal relationships. The state cannot criminalize private sexual conduct simply because it is viewed by some as immoral or unacceptable.

This decision aligns with an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. It reflects evolving standards of decency and a growing recognition of the fundamental rights of all persons to make intimate and personal choices without unwarranted governmental intrusion. The Constitution's promise of liberty must be interpreted to include protection for adults to engage in consensual sexual conduct in the privacy of their homes.

Concurrence (O'Connor, J.) The Texas law is unconstitutional because it discriminates against homosexuals as a class without a legitimate state interest. This violates the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause. Laws that treat same-sex and different-sex sodomy differently cannot withstand even rational basis review. This approach avoids overruling Bowers v. Hardwick while still invalidating the statute in question.

Dissent (Scalia, J.) The Court has no basis for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick. Laws based on moral choices are constitutionally permissible. Today's decision will lead to the invalidation of many other morals laws. The Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assessing our society's changing views objectively. This decision effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation and erodes the democratic process.

Dissent (Thomas, J.) While this law is uncommonly silly, there is no general right to privacy or liberty in the Constitution that would invalidate it. As a member of this Court, I am not empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. The appropriate recourse is through the democratic process, not through the courts. If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal this law.