Can a landlord be required under the Fair Housing Act to reasonably accommodate a disabled tenant's request to keep pets in a no-pet building when the pets are not service animals but provide emotional support?

Brenda Janush suffers from a severe mental health disability and her treating psychiatrist testified that her two birds and two cats are necessary to her mental health by providing companionship. On December 6, 1999, Janush signed a rental agreement for an apartment in Pensione Esperanza, a low-income building operated by Charities Housing Development Corp., a non-profit affiliated with Catholic Charities. The rental agreement contained a no-pets clause in paragraph 23. Janush did not disclose her animals before moving in on January 2, 2000. On January 10, 2000, a maintenance worker discovered the animals. Discussions followed between Janush and defendants about keeping the animals, with the parties disagreeing on what accommodations were offered. Janush alleged harassment and refusal to accommodate, while defendants claimed they were willing to accommodate but Janush refused to provide requested documentation like vaccination proof. Defendants filed eviction proceedings on February 7, 2000, and Janush moved out on March 26, 2000.

Janush filed suit on March 10, 2000, alleging discrimination based on defendants' refusal to reasonably accommodate her disability under the Fair Housing Act and other federal and state laws. Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The motions were heard on June 16, 2000.

(Whyte, J.)

No. The motions to dismiss and for summary judgment are denied. To establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination based on refusal to make reasonable accommodations under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must show: (1) she suffers from a handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) accommodation may be necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation. Defendants failed to identify which elements of which causes of action were inadequately pleaded and cited no supporting case law in their brief motion papers. Their argument that California's definition of "service dog" should create a federal bright-line rule excluding accommodation of other animals lacks merit. While federal regulations specifically mention seeing-eye dogs, there is no indication that accommodation of other animals is per se unreasonable. Federal regulations broadly define service animals as "any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability." Even if plaintiff's animals do not qualify as service animals, defendants have not established there is no duty to reasonably accommodate non-service animals. The reasonable accommodation inquiry under 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination and is rarely appropriate for summary judgment resolution. Without discovery regarding the likely costs or administrative burdens of accommodation, the court cannot balance those burdens against the benefit to plaintiff. Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) request to defer summary judgment pending discovery is well-taken.