Does a state court have personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer when the manufacturer places its product into the stream of commerce through a U.S. distributor without directly targeting the forum state?

Robert Nicastro injured his hand while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (J. McIntyre), a British company incorporated and operating in England. The accident occurred in New Jersey. J. McIntyre manufactured the machine in England and sold it through an independent U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. The British manufacturer had no office in New Jersey, paid no taxes there, owned no property there, and never advertised in or sent employees to the state. J. McIntyre officials attended annual trade shows in various U.S. states but never in New Jersey. The company held U.S. and European patents on its technology. The U.S. distributor structured its advertising and sales efforts according to J. McIntyre's direction and guidance. At most four J. McIntyre machines, including the one that injured Nicastro, ended up in New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the state could exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre because the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that its products were distributed through a nationwide system that might lead to sales in any of the fifty states.

Nicastro filed a products-liability suit against J. McIntyre in New Jersey state court. J. McIntyre moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey courts could exercise jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer, applying a stream-of-commerce doctrine and relying partly on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court. The court concluded that J. McIntyre was subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey despite never having advertised in, sent goods to, or targeted the state. J. McIntyre petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted the petition and heard oral arguments.

(Kennedy, J.)

No. New Jersey lacks personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre because the company never engaged in activities that revealed an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of New Jersey's laws. Due process protects a defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power. A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the sovereign such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. As a general rule, the sovereign's exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

The stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede the mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that clause ensures. While a defendant's placement of goods into commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum state may indicate purposeful availment, this does not amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction. The principal inquiry is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.

The imprecision arising from Asahi results from its statement of the relation between jurisdiction and the stream of commerce. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Asahi, which advocated a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power. The defendant's actions, not expectations, empower a state's courts to subject him to judgment. Personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum analysis of whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign.

J. McIntyre directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States generally but did not engage in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey specifically. The facts show an intent to serve the U.S. market but do not demonstrate that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market. The company had no office, paid no taxes, owned no property, advertised nowhere, and sent no employees to New Jersey.

Concurrence (Breyer, J.) The New Jersey Supreme Court's judgment must be reversed based on existing precedents without announcing broad new rules. The facts do not provide constitutionally sufficient contacts between the British firm and New Jersey. A single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is insufficient under precedent. The Court's previous holdings in World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi suggest the contrary result. This case presents no regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey, and there is no something more such as special state-related design, advertising, advice, or marketing that would warrant assertion of jurisdiction. The case does not present modern concerns about globalization and commerce, making it unsuitable for broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules without full consideration of modern-day consequences.

Dissent (Ginsburg, J.) McIntyre UK should be answerable in New Jersey for the harm Nicastro suffered. The foreign manufacturer sought to develop a U.S. market for its machines and hoped to derive substantial revenue from U.S. sales. It excluded no region or state from the market it wished to reach. McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market and engaged a U.S. distributor to promote and sell its machines anywhere in the United States. The company regularly attended ISRI conventions from 1990 through 2005 hoping to reach anyone interested in the machine from anywhere in the United States. By engaging McIntyre America as its exclusive U.S. distributor, McIntyre UK purposefully availed itself of the United States market nationwide. Modern international commerce warrants exercise of jurisdiction where a foreign manufacturer's dangerous product causes workplace injury, and the plurality opinion takes a giant step away from the notions of fair play and substantial justice underlying International Shoe.