Does a state court violate the Due Process Clause by exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that targeted the United States market generally through a distributor, but did not specifically direct any activities at the forum State, where a single machine ended up and caused injury?

Robert Nicastro seriously injured his hand while operating a metal-shearing machine at his workplace in New Jersey. The machine was manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (J. McIntyre), a company incorporated and operating in England. J. McIntyre sold its machines in the United States through an independent distributor, McIntyre America, which was not under J. McIntyre's control. J. McIntyre officials attended annual scrap recycling industry conventions in various States, but never in New Jersey. No more than four J. McIntyre machines, and the record suggests only one, ended up in New Jersey. J. McIntyre held United States and European patents on its technology, and its distributor structured advertising and sales efforts under J. McIntyre's guidance. J. McIntyre had no office in New Jersey, paid no taxes there, owned no property there, and neither advertised in nor sent employees to the State. The trial court found that J. McIntyre had no contact with New Jersey apart from the machine in question ending up there.

Nicastro filed a products-liability suit against J. McIntyre in New Jersey state court. J. McIntyre moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court found that J. McIntyre had no contact with New Jersey other than the machine's arrival there. The Appellate Division reversed, finding jurisdiction proper. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, holding that New Jersey courts may exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process over a foreign manufacturer that knows or reasonably should know its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to sales in any of the fifty States. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that judgment.

(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)

Yes, the exercise of jurisdiction violates due process. The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court is reversed. The reasoning below is Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, joined by three Justices; Justices Breyer and Alito concurred only in the judgment.

Due process protects a defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power. A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the sovereign such that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As a general rule, the exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

The stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot displace this rule. A defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted its goods would reach the forum State. Justice Brennan's Asahi concurrence, which made foreseeability the touchstone, is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power, because it is the defendant's actions, not expectations, that empower a State's courts to subject him to judgment. Jurisdiction is first a question of authority rather than fairness, and requires a forum-by-forum analysis of whether the defendant followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy of that sovereign.

Applied here, J. McIntyre had no office, paid no taxes, owned no property, did not advertise in, and sent no employees to New Jersey. The distributor's agreement to sell in the United States, attendance at trade shows in other States, and the arrival of up to four machines in New Jersey may reveal an intent to serve the United States market, but they do not show purposeful availment of the New Jersey market. Because the relevant inquiry concerns contacts with the State, not the Nation, New Jersey lacks power to adjudge J. McIntyre's rights and liabilities, and the State's interest in protecting its citizens from defective products cannot override the limits of due process.

Concurring in the judgment (Breyer, J.) The result is correct under existing precedent, but the plurality's broad rule should not be adopted. Nicastro bore the burden of establishing jurisdiction and showed only a single isolated sale, with no regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey and no 'something more' such as special state-related design, advertising, or marketing. No precedent finds that sufficient. A broad rule is unwise because the case does not implicate modern commerce, such as Internet sales, Web-site marketing, or intermediary fulfillment through sellers like Amazon.com, and the plurality's strict targeting rule leaves those questions unanswered. The New Jersey Supreme Court's absolute foreseeability rule is also rejected, because it would subject small manufacturers, such as an Appalachian potter or a Kenyan coffee farmer, to suit anywhere a single item lands and would abandon the settled inquiry into the defendant's relationship to the forum. Any change to the law should await a case with a fuller record, ideally one in which the Solicitor General participates.

Dissent (Ginsburg, J.) A foreign manufacturer that deliberately targets the entire United States market through an exclusive distributor should be answerable in the State where its product causes injury. J. McIntyre UK attended every ISRI convention from 1990 through 2005, sought customers anywhere in the United States, retained an exclusive national distributor, and carried products-liability insurance. The machine reached New Jersey, the nation's largest scrap-metal market, through the distribution system J. McIntyre deliberately arranged, not randomly or fortuitously. The plurality revives discredited fictions of consent and submission and puts sovereignty ahead of fairness, contrary to International Shoe, Shaffer, and Burger King. Fair play, litigational convenience, and choice-of-law considerations all favor the place of injury, and the burden on J. McIntyre is a reasonable cost of doing business, compared to requiring Nicastro to sue in England. Asahi is distinguishable because it involved a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, and a transaction abroad. The ruling also puts U.S. plaintiffs at a disadvantage relative to plaintiffs in the European Union, where the place of the harmful event supports jurisdiction.