Can Congress constitutionally reserve for itself the power to override, through a one-House veto, an executive decision to suspend deportation of a particular alien?

Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya with a British passport, entered the United States legally in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired in 1972. Two years later, in 1974, an Immigration Judge suspended Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Subsequently, the House of Representatives exercised its authority under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, passing a resolution to veto the suspension of Chadha's deportation. This action resulted in an order for Chadha's deportation.

In response to the deportation order, Chadha initiated a legal challenge against the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section had granted the House of Representatives the power to veto the suspension of his deportation, which directly led to the reinstatement of deportation proceedings against him.

Chadha was initially ordered deported. He appealed this order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In this petition, he challenged the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals ruled in Chadha's favor, holding that the House lacked constitutional authority to order his deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the separation of powers doctrine. Following this decision, the case was brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari.

(Burger, C.J.)

No. The legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) violates the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. Legislative actions that alter legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must comply with Article I procedures for lawmaking. These procedures require passage by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the President for approval or veto. The legislative veto circumvents this process, allowing one House to unilaterally override executive decisions without satisfying constitutional requirements. This violates the separation of powers doctrine, a fundamental principle of constitutional design. The Framers intended the legislative process to be difficult, requiring the participation of both Houses and the President to safeguard against arbitrary governance. By bypassing these safeguards, the legislative veto concentrates too much power in one branch, undermining the system of checks and balances. The Constitution's precise, finely wrought procedures for lawmaking cannot be circumvented by Congress, even for pragmatic reasons. Any departure from the specific procedures outlined in Article I for exercising legislative power is unconstitutional, regardless of its potential convenience or efficiency. The legislative veto's unconstitutionality extends beyond this specific provision, invalidating similar mechanisms across various statutes. This ruling reinforces the principle that Congress cannot delegate its constitutional responsibilities or reclaim them through shortcuts that bypass constitutional requirements.

Concurrence (Powell, J.) The legislative veto in this case violates the doctrine of separation of powers by allowing Congress to exercise a judicial function in determining whether a particular person meets statutory criteria. This overreach undermines the careful balance of power established by the Constitution and sets a dangerous precedent for future legislative actions.

Dissent (White, J.) The legislative veto is an important political invention that allows Congress to retain control over lawmaking. The Court's decision strikes down an essential mechanism for maintaining the balance between the Legislative and Executive branches. This ruling will significantly impair Congress's ability to oversee and check executive power, potentially leading to an imbalance in our system of government.

Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision to be severable from the rest of the statute. Therefore, the entire section should be struck down rather than just the veto provision. This approach respects legislative intent and avoids judicial overreach in rewriting statutes. The Court's decision to sever only part of the law creates a statute that Congress never intended to enact.