Does the one-House legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows a single House of Congress to overrule the Attorney General's decision to suspend a deportable alien's deportation, violate the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements?

Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya and holding a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In 1973, the INS ordered him to show cause why he should not be deported for overstaying. Chadha conceded deportability and applied for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(1), which permits the Attorney General to suspend deportation for aliens with seven years of continuous presence, good moral character, and who would suffer extreme hardship. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge found Chadha met these requirements and suspended his deportation, reporting the suspension to Congress under § 244(c)(1). Section 244(c)(2) allowed either House, by resolution, to veto the suspension. On December 12, 1975, shortly before the deadline, Representative Eilberg introduced a resolution opposing permanent residence for six aliens, including Chadha. The resolution was passed by the House without debate or recorded vote, was not printed beforehand, and was never submitted to the Senate or presented to the President. The Immigration Judge then reopened proceedings and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House action.

After the House veto, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings and, on November 8, 1976, ordered Chadha deported, ruling he lacked authority to decide the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2). Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which held it had no power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and dismissed the appeal. Chadha petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under § 106(a) of the Act. The INS agreed with Chadha that § 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit invited both Houses of Congress to file amicus briefs and later allowed them to intervene. The Ninth Circuit held that the House lacked constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation, finding § 244(c)(2) violated the separation of powers, and directed the Attorney General to cease deportation steps based on the House resolution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171 (brought by the House and Senate), postponed the jurisdictional question in the INS appeal, No. 80-1832, and heard argument twice.

(Burger, J.)

Yes. The one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) violates the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I and is unconstitutional. It is also severable from the remainder of § 244.

The Court first resolved threshold questions. Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 because the INS was aggrieved by a judgment barring it from taking action it would otherwise take, even though it agreed the statute was unconstitutional. Section 406 of the Act contains an express severability clause, creating a presumption that the veto can be excised, and § 244 remains fully operative without it. Chadha has standing because invalidating the veto cancels his deportation order. A genuine case or controversy exists given the INS's intent to deport and Congress's intervention as a defending party, and the political question doctrine does not bar review because Article I supplies judicially manageable standards.

On the merits, Article I vests all legislative power in a Congress of two Houses (Art. I, § 1), requires every bill passed by both Houses to be presented to the President (Art. I, § 7, cl. 2), and extends that requirement to every order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses (Art. I, § 7, cl. 3). These provisions embody the Framers' deliberate design: the Presidential veto checks legislative overreach and ensures a national perspective, while bicameralism ensures careful, fully considered legislation and guards against despotism within a single body.

Whether congressional action is subject to these requirements depends on whether it is legislative in purpose and effect, meaning it alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the Legislative Branch. The House's veto did exactly that: it overrode the Attorney General's decision and mandated Chadha's deportation. Absent the veto, the same result could be accomplished only by legislation passed by both Houses and presented to the President. Amendment and repeal of statutes likewise must satisfy Article I.

The Constitution identifies four narrow instances in which one House may act alone with binding effect: initiating impeachment, trying impeachments, approving appointments, and ratifying treaties. The one-House veto fits none of them. Efficiency and convenience cannot justify bypassing the Constitution's prescribed lawmaking procedure.

Concurrence in the judgment (Powell, J.) The decision should rest on narrower grounds than the Presentment Clauses, which would invalidate every legislative veto. Congress violated the separation of powers by assuming a judicial function. By deciding that six specific persons, including Chadha, did not meet the statutory criteria for suspension of deportation, the House adjudicated individual rights without general rules, procedural safeguards, or an impartial tribunal. The majority answered that the analogy to judicial action is less than perfect and held the one-House veto legislative in purpose and effect. This is the unchecked power the Framers feared, reflected in the Bill of Attainder Clause and the concern over trial by legislature. Powell would not reach the broader question of whether all legislative vetoes are invalid.

Dissent (White, J.) The Court's sweeping decision invalidates nearly 200 statutory provisions and strips Congress of an indispensable tool for controlling delegated authority in a complex modern government. The legislative veto is a practical, historically accepted accommodation that lets Congress delegate broad power while retaining accountability. Article I's presentment and bicameralism requirements govern the enactment of new legislation, not Congress's reservation of a check on delegated power. Under § 244, a change in the alien's status occurs only with the concurrence of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate, so the purposes of Article I are fully served. The majority rejected this theory, saying it would amend Article I by letting Congress enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence. The Court's reasoning is inconsistent with its approval of broad delegations of lawmaking power to agencies exercising quasi-legislative authority without bicameral passage or presentment. The majority answered that executive action under delegated authority is checked by the statute and by judicial review, while a one-House veto has no such check. The decision should have been confined to the narrower facts of this deportation case.

Dissent (Rehnquist, J., joined by White, J.) Section 244(c)(2) is not severable from the rest of § 244. Despite the severability clause, Congress consistently refused to grant the Executive final authority over suspensions of deportation and always insisted on retaining a veto. The majority answered that Congress's reluctance to delegate final authority does not overcome the § 406 presumption of severability, and that § 244 works without the veto. Severing the veto expands the Attorney General's power beyond anything Congress intended, contrary to Davis v. Wallace and Spraigue v. Thompson, which hold that an unconstitutional exception should not enlarge the scope of the provisions it was meant to restrain. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.