Does the First Amendment bar a public figure from recovering damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by a publication parodying him, without showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact made with actual malice?

Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, was the subject of a parody in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine. The inside front cover carried a mock advertisement for Campari Liqueur, modeled on actual Campari ads that interviewed celebrities about their 'first times' and played on the sexual double entendre of the phrase. Hustler's version featured Falwell's name and picture and presented a fabricated 'interview' in which he states that his 'first time' was a drunken incestuous encounter with his mother in an outhouse. The parody portrayed Falwell and his mother as drunk and immoral and suggested he was a hypocrite who preaches only when drunk. Small print at the bottom read 'ad parody not to be taken seriously,' and the table of contents listed it as 'Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.' Falwell sued Hustler Magazine, its publisher Larry Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Co. for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Falwell filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Hustler Magazine, Inc., Larry C. Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. At the close of the evidence, the District Court directed a verdict for the defendants on the invasion of privacy claim and submitted the libel and emotional distress claims to the jury. The jury found against Falwell on the libel claim, finding the parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about him, but found for him on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. It awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages from each petitioner. The jury found no liability on the part of Flynt Distributing Co. The District Court denied petitioners' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the argument that the New York Times actual malice standard must be met for the emotional distress claim. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a divided court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

(Rehnquist, C.J.)

Yes. Public figures and public officials may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of a publication such as this parody without showing that it contains a false statement of fact made with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard as to whether it was true.

The free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest lies at the heart of the First Amendment. Debate about public figures will produce speech that is caustic, one-sided, and intended to injure. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), public figures may recover for defamatory falsehoods only on a showing of actual malice, which gives free expression necessary 'breathing space.'

That protection cannot be avoided by relabeling the claim as one for emotional distress. A speaker's bad motive or intent to injure does not strip speech about public figures of protection. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), held that expression motivated by hatred or ill will remains protected. Were intent to inflict emotional distress enough, political cartoonists and satirists would face damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject. Caricature and satire from Thomas Nast onward have played a prominent role in public and political debate, even when calculated to injure the feelings of their subjects.

An 'outrageousness' standard cannot supply a principled line between acceptable and unacceptable satire. It is inherently subjective and would let juries impose liability based on their tastes or their dislike of a particular expression. That conflicts with the settled rule that speech may not be punished because it is offensive or has an adverse emotional impact on its audience. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The parody falls within no recognized exception such as fighting words under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

Falwell is a public figure, and the jury found the parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about him. Because there is no false statement of fact, the emotional distress award cannot stand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Concurring in the judgment (White, J.) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has little to do with this case because the jury found the ad contained no assertion of fact. The judgment below, which penalized publication of the parody, cannot be squared with the First Amendment.