Does a federal court sitting in diversity apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), which permits service on an individual by leaving copies at his dwelling with a person of suitable age and discretion residing there, rather than a conflicting state law requiring in-hand service on an executor?

Petitioner Hanna, an Ohio citizen, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on February 6, 1963, seeking damages exceeding $10,000 for personal injuries from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen who had died before the complaint was filed. Respondent, Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, which complied with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent answered that the action could not be maintained because it violated Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 197, Section 9, which requires that an executor be served by delivery in hand, that service be accepted by him, or that a notice of the claim be filed in the proper probate registry within one year of his giving bond. Petitioner conceded she had not complied with Section 9. The complaint was timely filed within the one-year period, and respondent did not claim lack of actual notice.

The District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, relying on Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York to conclude that the adequacy of service was governed by Section 9, with which petitioner had not complied. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, admitting noncompliance with Section 9 but arguing that Rule 4(d)(1) governed service in diversity actions. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, concluding that the conflict concerned a substantive rather than a procedural matter. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.

(Warren, C.J.)

Yes. Rule 4(d)(1) controls service of process in a federal diversity action even when a conflicting state service rule exists. The Rule is valid under the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution, and the Erie doctrine does not displace it.

Rule 4(d)(1) regulates the manner in which a defendant is notified that suit has been filed, which falls within the "practice and procedure of the district courts" authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. The test is whether a rule "really regulates procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Rule 4(d)(1) satisfies that test, as did Rule 4(f) in Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). Incidental effects on litigants' rights do not make a procedural rule substantive.

Respondent's argument that Guaranty Trust Co. v. York's "outcome-determination" test demands application of the Massachusetts rule fails for two reasons. First, outcome-determination was never meant as a talisman; it must be read in light of the twin aims of Erie: discouraging forum-shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws. The difference between in-hand service and substituted service on a spouse at the residence would not influence the choice of forum and does not create the kind of substantial disparity that raises equal protection concerns. Every procedural variation is outcome-determinative in the sense that noncompliance can end a case.

Second, and more fundamentally, the Erie rule is not the test for the validity or applicability of a Federal Rule. When a situation is covered by a Federal Rule, the court must apply it unless it transgresses the Enabling Act or the Constitution. Cases like Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), applying state law did so because the Federal Rule was not broad enough to cover the point in dispute. Here the clash is unavoidable. Congress's power to regulate practice and pleading in federal courts extends to matters rationally capable of classification as either substance or procedure. The Rule is valid and controls. The judgment is reversed.

Concurring in the result (Black, J.) Justice Black concurs in the result without a separate opinion.

Concurrence (Harlan, J.) Erie is a cornerstone of federalism that protects state authority over primary private conduct and prevents the federal judiciary from making substantive law beyond Congress's legislative powers. The majority errs by treating the "outcome-determinative" and forum-shopping tests as inadequate and then adopting an "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional" test that makes the Federal Rules inviolate so long as a reasonable person could call them procedural. The proper test asks whether the choice of rule would substantially affect primary decisions respecting human conduct that the Constitution leaves to state regulation; if so, the state rule must prevail even against a conflicting Federal Rule. On that basis, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. was wrongly decided, and Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. is better explained as protecting a state policy against strike suits. Applying that test here, using Rule 4(d)(1) would only require an executor to check his house or the federal courthouse in addition to the probate registry, which does not substantially impair the state policy. Harlan concurs in the judgment.