Can a state grant exclusive rights to operate steamboats in its waters when such rights conflict with federal interstate commerce regulations?

Thomas Gibbons operated steamboats between New York and New Jersey under a federal coasting license. Aaron Ogden held an exclusive license from New York state to operate steamboats in New York waters. Ogden obtained an injunction from New York courts that prohibited Gibbons from operating his steamboats in New York. Gibbons appealed this decision, contending that the New York law was in conflict with federal authority to regulate interstate commerce.

The case arose from a dispute over steamboat operating rights in New York waters, pitting state-granted monopoly privileges against federally-issued licenses for interstate commerce. It involved questions of state versus federal regulatory power over commercial activities crossing state lines.

Ogden initiated legal proceedings by filing a bill in the New York Court of Chancery, seeking an injunction against Gibbons. The Chancellor granted a permanent injunction in Ogden's favor. Gibbons, dissatisfied with this outcome, appealed the decision to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of New York. This court affirmed the Chancellor's decree, maintaining the injunction against Gibbons. Undeterred, Gibbons then escalated the matter by appealing to the United States Supreme Court, bringing the case to its final judicial forum.

(Marshall, C.J.)

No. States cannot grant exclusive rights to operate steamboats in their waters when such rights conflict with federal interstate commerce regulations. The power to regulate interstate commerce is vested exclusively in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. This authority extends to navigation between states, which falls squarely within the definition of interstate commerce. Federal laws and regulations enacted pursuant to this power supersede conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. A federal coasting license issued under Congressional authority takes precedence over any exclusive state-granted rights that would interfere with interstate navigation. The Commerce Clause must be interpreted broadly to encompass all commercial intercourse between states, including navigation on waterways connecting multiple states. Any state law that obstructs the freedom of interstate commerce as regulated by Congress is unconstitutional and void. This interpretation ensures a uniform system of commerce throughout the nation, preventing individual states from creating barriers to trade or navigation that would impede the national economy. The constitutional framework clearly establishes federal supremacy in matters of interstate commerce, leaving no room for state laws that would create monopolies or exclusive rights in conflict with federal regulations designed to promote free interstate trade and navigation.

Concurrence (Johnson, J.) The Commerce Clause itself, without any action by Congress, prohibits state laws interfering with interstate commerce. This interpretation extends beyond the majority's focus on federal preemption, suggesting a dormant or negative aspect to the Commerce Clause that limits state power even in the absence of federal legislation. This view has significant implications for the balance of power between state and federal governments in regulating commerce.