Can a woman who consents to her own transportation across state lines for immoral purposes be convicted of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act when she did not actively participate in planning or purchasing the transportation?

Petitioners, an unmarried man and woman, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Mann Act by transporting the woman from one state to another for sexual intercourse. Evidence showed they engaged in illicit sexual relations during their journeys, the man purchased railway tickets for both, and the woman consented in advance to each journey and traveled voluntarily for the immoral purpose. There was no evidence of any other conspirators or that the woman actively participated in planning the transportation beyond her consent and voluntary participation.

Petitioners were indicted in the District Court for Northern Illinois for conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. At a bench trial, the court overruled motions for findings for defendants and motions in arrest of judgment, entering convictions. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions on authority of United States v. Holte. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.

(Stone, J.)

No. A woman cannot be convicted of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act based solely on her consent to transportation for immoral purposes. The Mann Act punishes those who transport women or aid in transportation but does not criminalize the woman's mere acquiescence to her own transportation. Section 2 of the Mann Act contemplates two distinct roles: the transporter and the woman being transported. For a woman to violate the Act, she must at minimum aid or assist someone else in transporting her, requiring more active participation than mere agreement to the transportation and its immoral purpose.

The legislative policy underlying the Mann Act demonstrates Congress's intent to leave the woman's acquiescence unpunished. Congress specifically addressed cases involving the woman's consent and agreement, which frequently occur in Mann Act violations, yet chose not to criminalize her participation. This represents an affirmative legislative policy of immunity for the woman's mere consent.

While conspiracy law generally permits conviction of one who cannot commit the substantive offense, this case presents a unique situation where the criminal object of the conspiracy necessarily involves the same agreement and cooperation that forms the basis of the conspiracy charge. The substantive offense contemplated by the Mann Act inherently involves the woman's acquiescence in cases where she is not intimidated or forced. To allow conspiracy prosecution for the same conduct that the Mann Act deliberately left unpunished would contravene the legislative policy of immunity. The principle applies similarly to cases where consent of an unmarried person to adultery with a married person, or acquiescence of an underage woman in statutory rape, would not render them conspirators in crimes they cannot themselves commit.

Concurrence (Cardozo, J.) Concurs in the result without providing additional reasoning.