Does Maryland's second degree rape statute, Art. 27, § 463(a)(3), which prohibits vaginal intercourse with a person under 14 by someone at least four years older, impose strict liability such that a defendant may not introduce evidence of a reasonable mistake as to the complainant's age?

Raymond Garnett, a 20-year-old mildly retarded man with an I.Q. of 52, read at a third-grade level, did arithmetic at a fifth-grade level, and interacted socially at the level of an 11- or 12-year-old. In late 1990, a friend introduced him to Erica Frazier, who was 13. On February 28, 1991, Garnett went to her house around nine in the evening. Erica opened her bedroom window and told him to get a ladder and climb up. The two talked and later engaged in voluntary sexual intercourse. Garnett left at about 4:30 a.m. Erica gave birth to a child fathered by Garnett on November 19, 1991. At trial, the defense twice proffered evidence that Erica and her friends had told Garnett she was 16 and that he believed it. The trial court excluded the evidence, ruling that the offense is one of strict liability and that consent, the victim's representation of her age, and the defendant's good-faith belief are not defenses.

Garnett was tried without a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on one count of second degree rape under § 463(a)(3). The trial court excluded the evidence of his mistaken belief about Erica's age and found him guilty. It sentenced him to five years in prison, suspended the sentence, imposed five years of probation, and ordered restitution to Erica and the Frazier family. Garnett appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari before intermediate appellate review by the Court of Special Appeals.

(Murphy, C.J.)

Yes. Section 463(a)(3) defines a strict liability offense. The State need not prove that the defendant knew the complainant was under 14, and a mistake-of-age defense is unavailable.

The plain language and structure of § 463 show legislative design. Subsection (a)(2), which prohibits intercourse with a mentally defective, incapacitated, or helpless person, expressly requires that the actor knows or should reasonably know of the victim's condition. Subsection (a)(3) contains no such language. Reading the statute as a whole, the omission indicates the Legislature intended a more severe prohibition without a mens rea element. McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320 (1984).

The drafting history of the 1976 revision confirms this. The Senate amended the bill to create a lesser offense for victims aged 12 to 14 that required the actor to know or should know the victim's age. The House of Delegates rejected those amendments and defined rape for victims under 14 without any mens rea requirement, and the Senate concurred. The Legislature thus considered and expressly rejected a knowledge element.

This interpretation matches the traditional view of statutory rape as a strict liability crime protecting young persons from sexual exploitation, loss of chastity, physical injury, and pregnancy. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). A majority of states and the Court of Special Appeals, in Eggleston v. State, 4 Md. App. 124 (1968), treat statutory rape as strict liability. Even states allowing a mistake-of-age defense often withhold it where the complainant is 14 or younger, and Erica was 13.

The Court acknowledged the scholarly criticism of strict criminal liability and the minority rule of People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529 (1964), but concluded that any mens rea element or mistake-of-age defense must come from the Legislature, not judicial fiat. Defendants in extraordinary cases may rely on the trial court's sentencing discretion. The judgment is affirmed.

Dissent (Eldridge, J.) The statute is not purely strict liability, and the legislative history does not show that any evidence of a defendant's mental state is immaterial. The General Assembly rejected one specific knowledge requirement but did not decree that a defendant's knowledge and comprehension are irrelevant. The felony classification and 20-year penalty show the Legislature did not create a pure strict liability offense. The offense presupposes that the defendant can appreciate that engaging in sexual activity with a young person carries the risk that the partner is underage, and a defendant whose mental impairment prevents that appreciation lacks mens rea. Garnett's retardation may have affected his comprehension, but the trial court's strict liability view precluded any exploration of it. An ordinary defendant's mistake about age is not a defense, but the judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Dissent (Bell, J.) The statute may be read as strict liability, but due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 20 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights forbids imposing strict liability for a serious felony carrying up to 20 years and severe stigma. Fornication is not a crime in Maryland, so neither the lesser-legal-wrong nor the moral-wrong theory justifies dispensing with mens rea. By excluding knowledge of age from the offense, the Legislature creates an irrebuttable presumption of the defendant's knowledge and intent, relieving the State of its burden of proof and barring the defendant from rebutting it. A 13-year-old may plausibly appear to be of age. The State must prove the defendant's knowledge of age, and the defendant may defend on the basis of a reasonable mistake of fact. Garnett should have been allowed to present his defense.