Can a state impose a sentence of 25 years to life under a "Three Strikes" law for a non-violent theft offense without violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment?

Gary Ewing, while on parole from a 9-year prison sentence, stole three golf clubs valued at $399 each from a pro shop in Los Angeles County. Ewing had an extensive criminal record that included multiple felony convictions. For the golf club theft, he was convicted of felony grand theft. Due to California's three strikes law and Ewing's prior serious felony convictions, which included robbery and three residential burglaries, he received a sentence of 25 years to life in prison.

Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft in California state court. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life under the state's three strikes law. Ewing appealed his sentence, contending that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's sentence. Ewing then sought review from the California Supreme Court, which denied his petition. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the Eighth Amendment issue raised by Ewing's case.

(O'Connor, J.)

Yes. A state can impose a sentence of 25 years to life under a "Three Strikes" law for a non-violent theft offense without violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The sentence is justified by the state's legitimate public safety interest in incapacitating and deterring repeat felenders. When evaluating the proportionality of a sentence under the Eighth Amendment, the offender's current felony and entire criminal history must be considered, not just the most recent offense in isolation. The Three Strikes law represents a deliberate policy choice by the state legislature to address the problem of recidivism. Courts must grant substantial deference to legislative policy determinations in this area, particularly regarding the length of prison sentences. The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. A sentence of 25 years to life for a repeat offender convicted of felony grand theft does not meet this high threshold of gross disproportionality, given the state's interest in public safety and the offender's long criminal record demonstrating a pattern of recidivism. The Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory, and states have valid reasons to emphasize incapacitation and deterrence over rehabilitation for repeat offenders. While severe, this sentence falls within the broad discretion afforded to states in fashioning punishments for criminal offenses, particularly for repeat felons who have failed to reform despite multiple prior convictions and incarcerations.

Concurrence (Scalia, J.) The Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle for terms of imprisonment. Our precedents that purport to apply such a principle are badly reasoned and should be overruled. The Constitution does not mandate any particular penological theory, leaving such decisions to the states and their democratically elected legislatures.

Concurrence (Thomas, J.) The Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle. Our precedents suggesting otherwise are misguided and should be explicitly overruled. The determination of prison sentences is a legislative prerogative, not a judicial one. The Court should abandon the notion that it has the power to strike down sentences simply because they seem too harsh.

Dissent (Stevens, J.) Proportionality review is required by the Eighth Amendment. Judges must exercise their judgment in applying this principle to sentences. The majority's approach effectively abandons meaningful judicial review of excessive sentences, abdicating our constitutional duty to prevent cruel and unusual punishment. This decision undermines a fundamental protection enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

Dissent (Breyer, J.) Ewing's sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime when compared to sentences for similar crimes in California and other jurisdictions. A detailed proportionality analysis reveals the extreme nature of this punishment. The majority's deference to legislative choices ignores the judiciary's essential role in safeguarding constitutional rights. This decision weakens Eighth Amendment protections against excessive punishment.