Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permit a jury to infer a bottler's negligence when a sealed, properly handled carbonated beverage bottle explodes after delivery to a restaurant, where the plaintiff cannot identify any specific negligent act?

Gladys Escola, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca-Cola broke in her hand. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno (defendant) had bottled the beverage and delivered it to the restaurant. Defendant's driver placed several cases on the floor behind the counter, where they remained at least thirty-six hours. Escola moved the top case to an ice cream cabinet and began putting bottles into the refrigerator one at a time. After placing three bottles in the refrigerator and moving the fourth about eighteen inches from the case, it exploded in her hand, breaking into two jagged pieces and causing a deep five-inch cut that severed blood vessels, nerves, and muscles of her thumb and palm. Her employer and a coworker testified they heard a loud pop and that the bottle did not strike the case, door, or another bottle. The broken bottle was discarded by a restaurant employee and was not produced at trial. A driver for defendant testified he had seen other Coca-Cola bottles explode and had found broken bottles in the warehouse, though he did not know the cause. Escola alleged defendant negligently sold bottles that were dangerous due to excessive gas pressure or a defect in the glass. Unable to show specific acts of negligence, she relied entirely on res ipsa loquitur.

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Escola. Judgment was entered in her favor. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno appealed to the Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, arguing that res ipsa loquitur did not apply and that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.

(Gibson, C.J.)

Yes. Res ipsa loquitur applies and permits the jury to infer the bottler's negligence. The doctrine requires (1) that the defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing the injury and (2) that the accident ordinarily would not occur absent negligence. Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614 (1943).

Exclusive control is satisfied even though the explosion occurred after the bottle left defendant's possession, provided the plaintiff shows the bottle's condition did not change after delivery and that it was carefully handled. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that the bottle was not damaged by any extraneous force at the restaurant. Because sound bottles of carbonated liquid do not ordinarily explode when carefully handled, the bottle must have been defective when defendant relinquished control.

The second element is met because the explosion could result only from excessive gas pressure, a glass defect, or both, and neither would ordinarily occur without negligence. The charging of the bottle was within defendant's exclusive control, and overcharging would not ordinarily occur absent negligence. As for glass defects, expert testimony showed that manufacturers use nearly infallible pressure and thermal shock tests, so defects not visible to the eye are unlikely to exist when bottles are delivered to the bottler. Any visible defect would be caught by reasonable inspection, and an overlooked defect supports an inference of inadequate inspection. If hidden defects develop in reused bottles, the bottler has a duty to test them or stop reusing them.

Defendant's evidence of careful pressure regulation and visual inspection did not defeat the inference as a matter of law. When a defendant rebuts the inference, whether it has been dispelled is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal. 2d 439 (1941). The judgment is affirmed.

Concurrence in the judgment (Traynor, J.) Negligence should no longer be the basis of recovery in cases like this. A manufacturer should incur absolute liability when an article placed on the market, knowing it will be used without inspection, proves defective and causes injury to human beings. Public policy requires that responsibility be fixed where it will most effectively reduce hazards to life and health from defective products. The manufacturer can anticipate and guard against hazards as the public cannot, and can insure against the risk and distribute its cost among the public as a cost of doing business. Injured consumers are unprepared to bear the loss and cannot refute a manufacturer's evidence of proper care because they are unfamiliar with the manufacturing process. Leaving the jury to decide whether the inference of negligence is dispelled, regardless of the evidence, makes the negligence rule approach strict liability, so it is needlessly circuitous to preserve the fiction of negligence. California's Health and Safety Code imposes criminal liability without fault for adulterated food and its containers, reflecting a policy of protecting the public irrespective of negligence. Retailers already bear absolute liability through implied warranties of fitness and merchantable quality, and a warranty of safety should run directly from manufacturer to consumer as a tort-based strict liability, without fictions such as assignment or third-party beneficiary theories. With mass production, advertising, and trademarks, consumers rely on the manufacturer's reputation and cannot inspect products themselves, so the manufacturer's obligation must keep pace. Liability should be defined by the product's safety in normal and proper use and should not extend to injuries not traceable to the product as it reached the market.