Should federal courts be required to apply state court decisions on matters of general law, overturning the longstanding precedent set by Swift v. Tyson?

Tompkins, a Pennsylvania resident, sustained injuries while walking along a railroad right of way in Pennsylvania. The incident occurred when he was struck by an object protruding from a passing train owned by Erie Railroad Company, a New York corporation. Tompkins filed a lawsuit against Erie in federal court in New York, invoking diversity jurisdiction. Erie contended that under Pennsylvania law, Tompkins should be classified as a trespasser, which would limit Erie's duty of care. Tompkins, however, argued that the federal court should apply general federal common law rather than Pennsylvania state law in deciding the case.

Tompkins initiated a lawsuit against Erie Railroad Company in the federal district court in New York. The jury ruled in favor of Tompkins, awarding him $30,000 in damages. Erie Railroad Company appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. In its decision, the appellate court held that it was unnecessary to consider Pennsylvania law, as the question at hand was one of general law. Subsequently, Erie Railroad Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition to review whether the federal court was permitted to disregard Pennsylvania common law in deciding the case.

(Brandeis, J.)

Yes. Federal courts must apply state court decisions on matters of general law, overturning the longstanding precedent set by Swift v. Tyson. The Constitution does not confer upon federal courts the power to create substantive rules of common law applicable in a state. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson rests on the erroneous assumption that there is a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State's law. In reality, law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own should utter the last word. The fallacy underlying Swift v. Tyson is made clear by the fact that it introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens in matters of general law. It also prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State. The doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law, as a non-citizen could choose between two sets of law by bringing suit in state or federal court. This situation is fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. The Constitution recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States in their legislative and judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.

Dissent (Butler, J.) The Court should not have considered the constitutional question, as this case could have been decided on other grounds. The long-standing doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should not be overturned without appropriate deliberation. This hasty decision undermines judicial precedent and stability in federal jurisprudence.

Dissent (McReynolds, J.) Concurred with Justice Butler's dissenting opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Concurrence (Reed, J.) While I concur in the conclusion and disapproval of Swift v. Tyson, the majority's reliance on the unconstitutionality of the 'course pursued' by federal courts is unnecessary. The constitutional question need not be reached to resolve this case. This approach risks overstepping judicial bounds and may have unintended consequences for future interpretations of federal court authority.