Did Viva Parker Lilliston's will create a fee simple estate or merely a life estate for her daughter Margaret Lilliston Edwards?

Viva Parker Lilliston executed a will on January 12, 1957, leaving a farm in Accomack County, Virginia to her daughter Margaret Lilliston Edwards (later Margaret L. Jones). The will stipulated that Margaret was to keep the property free from encumbrances, not attempt to sell her interest, and protect it from creditors. Margaret's six children were named as contingent beneficiaries. At the time the will was drafted, Margaret was experiencing financial difficulties. The will was prepared by an experienced attorney who used 'fee simple' terminology in other parts of the document.

Viva Parker Lilliston died in 1969. In 1979, Margaret sought her children's consent to sell the farm. Margaret passed away in 1980, leaving a will directing the farm to be sold. Subsequently, Beverly Bradley, Margaret's daughter, filed a lawsuit against John R. Edwards and Betty Belle Branch (executors of Margaret's estate) and her other siblings. Bradley claimed that Margaret had only possessed a life estate in the farm, with the remainder interest belonging to her children.

Bradley filed a bill of complaint in the trial court against the executors of Margaret L. Jones's estate and her siblings. The trial court heard evidence from Bradley, while Edwards presented no evidence. Following the hearing, the trial judge issued a letter opinion, concluding that the Lilliston will devised a life estate to Jones with remainder to her six named children in fee simple. On March 25, 1981, the trial court entered a final decree based on this opinion. Subsequently, Edwards appealed the decision to the current court.

(Cochran, J.)

No. Viva Parker Lilliston's will created a life estate for her daughter Margaret Lilliston Edwards, not a fee simple estate. The testamentary language carefully avoided using "fee simple" terminology and instead demonstrated clear intent to protect the property from Margaret's creditors, which is inconsistent with granting a fee simple estate. Conditions totally prohibiting alienation of vested fee simple estates are void, but such restrictions on life estates are valid. A life estate may be created by implication when the will shows the requisite intent, as is evident here. The ultimate beneficiaries - Margaret's children - were intended to take the farm upon termination of their mother's interest, further supporting the life estate interpretation. The testatrix's intention must be upheld if it can be reasonably construed and does not conflict with established law. The careful wording and protective measures in the will unambiguously indicate the intent to grant Margaret a life estate with remainder to her children in fee simple, rather than an outright fee simple estate to Margaret. This construction aligns with the testatrix's clear wishes to benefit both Margaret and her children while shielding the property from potential creditors. The life estate designation achieves these aims in a legally valid manner, respecting both testamentary freedom and established principles of property law.