Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to trial by jury in state criminal prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than six months?

Gary Duncan, a 19-year-old African American, was driving on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, when he saw two younger Negro cousins engaged in conversation with four white boys by the roadside. Knowing his cousins had recently transferred to a formerly all-white high school and had reported racial incidents there, Duncan stopped his car and approached the group. Testimony was disputed regarding the encounter, but witnesses agreed that Duncan spoke to the boys, encouraged his cousins to leave, and was about to enter his car to drive away. White witnesses testified that Duncan slapped Herman Landry, one of the white boys, on the elbow just before getting in the car. The Negro witnesses testified that Duncan had not slapped Landry but had merely touched him. Duncan was charged with simple battery under Louisiana law, which is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a $300 fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but under Louisiana's constitution, jury trials are granted only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. The trial judge denied the jury trial request, convicted Duncan of simple battery, and sentenced him to 60 days in parish prison and a $150 fine.

Duncan was tried and convicted of simple battery in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana. The trial judge denied Duncan's request for a jury trial based on Louisiana's constitutional provision limiting jury trials to cases involving capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment and a $150 fine. Duncan appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, asserting that the denial of jury trial violated his rights under the United States Constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Duncan's writ of certiorari, finding no error of law in the trial court's ruling. Duncan then appealed to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), alleging that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments secure the right to jury trial in state criminal prosecutions where sentences as long as two years may be imposed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.

(White, J.)

Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in state criminal prosecutions for serious crimes that would require jury trial in federal court under the Sixth Amendment. Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court applied the test for determining whether rights in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, examining whether jury trial is among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of civil and political institutions. The historical evidence strongly supports considering jury trial fundamental to the system of justice. By the time the Constitution was written, jury trial had existed in England for several centuries with credentials traced to Magna Carta. It was among the major objectives of the revolutionary settlement and received strong support from English colonists. Royal interference with jury trials was deeply resented, and the Declaration of Independence specifically objected to the King's depriving colonists of jury trial benefits.

The Constitution itself commanded in Article III that trial of all crimes except impeachment shall be by jury. The Sixth Amendment further provided that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to trial by an impartial jury. Every state constitution has guaranteed jury trial in criminal cases, and no state has dispensed with it. The guarantees of jury trial reflect a profound judgment about how law should be enforced and justice administered, serving as protection against oppression by government, unfounded criminal charges, corrupt prosecutors, and biased judges.

A crime punishable by two years imprisonment is, based on past and contemporary standards, a serious crime rather than a petty offense. In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison. In 49 of 50 states, crimes triable without jury are punishable by no more than one year in jail. The Louisiana statute authorizing two years imprisonment for simple battery places it in the category of serious crimes requiring jury trial protection.

Concurrence (Black, J.) The Fourteenth Amendment makes all provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. This position, contrary to Twining v. New Jersey, was advocated in the Adamson v. California dissent and represents the most historically supportable interpretation. The selective incorporation process used by the Court, while perhaps less historically supportable than complete incorporation, has the virtue of limiting the Supreme Court to specific Bill of Rights protections and preventing judges from imposing their own policy preferences. The selective incorporation approach restricts courts to constitutional text rather than allowing judges to strike down state laws based on broad interpretations of due process that depend on individual judges' notions of fairness.

Dissent (Harlan, J.) The States should retain primary responsibility for operating criminal justice machinery within their borders, subject only to fundamental fairness requirements under the Due Process Clause. The Court's selective incorporation approach is an illogical compromise that lacks internal consistency. Due process should be interpreted through a gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion to ascertain immutable principles of free government, not through mechanical application of federal rules to states. Trial by jury, while ancient and significant, is not essential to fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings. Many jurisdictions successfully operate with alternatives to jury trial, and the burden of jury trials often outweighs marginal advantages for minor offenses. The Court provides no real analysis of whether Louisiana's procedure was fundamentally unfair to Duncan, instead arbitrarily declaring that jury trial is "in" rather than "out" of Fourteenth Amendment protection.