Can a parent recover damages for emotional distress and physical injuries suffered as a result of witnessing their child's death caused by another's negligence?

On September 27, 1964, a car driven by David Luther Legg collided with Erin Lee Dillon, an infant, on Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane in Sacramento County. The collision resulted in the death of Erin Lee Dillon. Margery M. Dillon, the mother of the deceased child and the plaintiff in this case, was in close proximity to the accident and personally witnessed it. Another daughter, Cheryl Dillon, was also present at the scene and witnessed the collision.

As a consequence of witnessing this tragic event, both Margery Dillon and Cheryl Dillon claim to have suffered emotional disturbance, shock, and injury to their nervous systems. The defendant in this case is David Luther Legg, the driver of the car involved in the fatal collision with Erin Lee Dillon.

The plaintiff filed a complaint with three causes of action related to Erin Lee Dillon's death and the emotional trauma suffered by her mother and sister. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted this motion for the mother's claim but denied it for the sister's claim. The mother then appealed the judgment on her claim. Subsequently, the defendant sought summary judgment on the sister's claim, which the court denied due to a pretrial order. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court of California for review.

(Tobriner, J.)

Yes. A parent can recover damages for emotional distress and physical injuries suffered as a result of witnessing their child's death caused by another's negligence. The concept of duty extends to foreseeable emotional harm suffered by a closely related bystander who witnesses a traumatic event. Foreseeability, rather than arbitrary rules, determines liability in these cases. The risk of emotional trauma to a parent witnessing their child's death or injury is a foreseeable consequence of negligent conduct. Arbitrary distinctions, such as requiring the parent to be within the "zone of danger," are rejected as unjust and inconsistent with tort principles. Instead, liability is determined by evaluating factors including the plaintiff's proximity to the accident scene, whether they directly observed the event, and their relationship to the victim. These guidelines balance the need to compensate genuine trauma against concerns of unlimited liability. Physical manifestations of emotional distress provide a safeguard against fraudulent claims. The fundamental principles of negligence law - duty, breach, causation, and damages - apply to bystander emotional distress claims as they do to other tort actions. Denying recovery in these cases would inequitably immunize negligent defendants from the full consequences of their actions and leave deserving plaintiffs without remedy. This holding aligns tort law with contemporary understanding of emotional harm and advances the compensatory and deterrent functions of the civil justice system.

Concurrence (Peters, J.) Concurred with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Concurrence (Mosk, J.) Concurred with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Concurrence (Sullivan, J.) Concurred with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.

Dissent (Traynor, C. J.) The Amaya case was correctly decided and should not be overruled. The established precedent set by Amaya provides a clear and consistent framework for addressing emotional distress claims. Overturning this precedent without compelling reasons undermines the stability and predictability of our legal system.

Dissent (Burke, J.) The majority's decision overturns established precedent without sufficient justification. This ruling opens the door to potentially infinite liability, creating uncertainty in tort law. The new guidelines are arbitrary and fail to provide clear boundaries for future cases. The legislature, not the court, is the appropriate body to address such far-reaching changes to tort law. This decision may lead to a flood of litigation and place an undue burden on the courts to determine the limits of liability in emotional distress cases.

Dissent (McComb, J.) Dissented with the majority opinion without providing a separate written opinion.