Do municipal ordinances that prohibit animal sacrifice while exempting other forms of animal killing violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a Santeria religious organization, announced plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, Florida, where they intended to practice animal sacrifice as a central element of their faith. Santeria teaches that animal sacrifice is essential for nurturing personal relationships with spirits called orishas, and practitioners sacrifice various animals including chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles by cutting the carotid arteries. The prospect of a Santeria church prompted the Hialeah city council to hold emergency sessions and pass several ordinances and resolutions. These included Resolution 87-66, which declared the city's commitment to prohibiting religious practices inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety, and four substantive ordinances that effectively banned animal sacrifice while exempting licensed food establishments, kosher slaughter, hunting, fishing, and pest control. The ordinances defined "sacrifice" as unnecessarily killing animals in religious rituals not primarily for food consumption and prohibited possessing animals intended for sacrifice. City council members made hostile statements during public meetings, with one councilman asking "What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?" and the police chaplain calling Santeria "an abomination to the Lord."

The Church and its president Ernesto Pichardo filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Free Exercise Clause rights and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to individual defendants, finding they had absolute immunity for legislative acts. After a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims, the District Court ruled for the city, finding no Free Exercise Clause violation despite acknowledging the ordinances were not religiously neutral and were prompted by the Church's establishment. The court applied a balancing test and found compelling governmental interests in protecting public health, preventing emotional injury to children, preventing animal cruelty, and restricting slaughter to properly zoned areas. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, declining to address the impact of Employment Division v. Smith because the District Court had applied an arguably stricter standard.

(Kennedy, J.)

Yes. The ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause because they are neither neutral nor generally applicable, and therefore must satisfy strict scrutiny, which they fail to meet. Laws burdening religious practice must be neutral and of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith. When a law fails these requirements, it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.

The ordinances lack neutrality in multiple respects. First, the legislative record demonstrates hostility toward Santeria, with city council members making statements like asking how to prevent the Church from opening and the police chaplain calling Santeria an "abomination." Second, the ordinances' text and operation reveal religious gerrymandering designed to target Santeria while exempting virtually all secular animal killings. The definition of "sacrifice" as killing animals "not for the primary purpose of food consumption" during rituals specifically targets religious practice while exempting kosher slaughter, hunting, fishing, pest control, and euthanasia.

The ordinances also fail the general applicability requirement because they are substantially underinclusive. Despite claiming interests in preventing animal cruelty and protecting public health, the ordinances permit numerous secular activities that pose equal or greater risks, including hunting, fishing, pest extermination, and restaurant disposal of uninspected meat. The city's assertion that religious killings are "different" from permitted secular killings lacks justification when many secular activities fall within the same governmental interests.

Even applying strict scrutiny, the ordinances cannot survive because they are not narrowly tailored and the governmental interests are not compelling in this context. The ordinances prohibit more religious conduct than necessary to achieve their stated ends. If improper disposal were the concern, the city could regulate garbage disposal generally rather than banning religious sacrifice entirely. Similarly, concerns about humane treatment could be addressed through regulations on killing methods rather than religious classifications.

Concurrence (Scalia, J.) The terms "neutrality" and "general applicability" substantially overlap and are interrelated concepts used to describe laws that do not constitute prohibitions on free exercise of religion. A law lacking neutrality applies primarily to those imposing disabilities based on religion, while lack of general applicability applies to laws that, though neutral in terms, target particular religious practices through design, construction, or enforcement. Legislative motive inquiry should be avoided because determining the singular motive of a collective legislative body is virtually impossible, and the First Amendment focuses on the effects of laws enacted rather than the purposes for which legislators enact them.

Concurrence (Souter, J.) This case does not present the difficult issue from Employment Division v. Smith because the animal-sacrifice laws clearly violate the noncontroversial principle that government action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice is prohibited. The Smith rule, which holds that neutral and generally applicable laws need not be justified by compelling governmental interests even when burdening religious exercise, merits reexamination. Smith conflicts with prior free-exercise cases that required strict scrutiny for formally neutral, generally applicable laws burdening religious practice. The rule was announced without full briefing and argument, was unnecessary to resolve the case, and creates intolerable tension in free-exercise jurisprudence that should be addressed when squarely presented.

Concurrence (Blackmun, J.) The First Amendment's protection extends beyond rare occasions when government explicitly targets religion for disfavored treatment. Any statute burdening free exercise may stand only if justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means. Smith was wrongly decided because it ignored religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as merely an antidiscrimination principle. Laws that discriminate against religion automatically fail strict scrutiny because they both burden free exercise and, by definition, are not precisely tailored to compelling governmental interests. The case does not address whether the Free Exercise Clause would require exemption from a law sincerely pursuing animal protection goals.