Do city ordinances that prohibit animal sacrifice and target the Santeria religion's central ritual, yet exempt most secular animal killings, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The Santeria religion, a fusion of Yoruba African traditions and Roman Catholicism, centers on devotion to spirits called orishas, with animal sacrifice as a principal form of devotion. Animals such as chickens, goats, and turtles are killed by cutting the carotid arteries and are usually cooked and eaten after the ritual. In April 1987, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to open a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum, with the aim of bringing Santeria practice, including animal sacrifice, into the open. The announcement alarmed many residents, and the Hialeah city council held an emergency session on June 9, 1987. It passed Resolution 87-66 and Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated Florida's animal cruelty statute. After the Florida attorney general opined that religious animal sacrifice violated state law, the council adopted Resolution 87-90 and Ordinances 87-52, 87-71, and 87-72. These ordinances defined sacrifice as the unnecessary killing of an animal in a ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption, banned possessing animals for such purposes, and restricted slaughter to areas zoned for slaughterhouses. They exempted licensed food establishments and small-scale hog and cattle slaughter. Council members and city officials voiced open hostility toward Santeria at the June 9 meeting.

The Church and its president, Ernesto Pichardo, sued the City of Hialeah, its mayor, and council members in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause and other claims, and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants on absolute legislative immunity grounds. After a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims, it ruled for the city. It found that the ordinances were not religiously neutral but concluded that their purpose was to end animal sacrifice generally, that their effect on religion was incidental, and that they served four compelling governmental interests. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, declining to address the effect of Employment Division v. Smith. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

(Kennedy, J.)

Yes. The ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause. A law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if it incidentally burdens religious practice. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). A law that fails either requirement must be justified by a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to advance it. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failing one is a likely indication that the other is also unmet.

Neutrality: A law is not neutral if its object is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation. Facial neutrality is not determinative, because the Free Exercise Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of religious practices. The ordinances' text uses the words "sacrifice" and "ritual," and Resolution 87-66 referred to religious groups. Their operation shows that almost the only conduct they reach is Santeria sacrifice. The definition of sacrifice excludes nearly all other killings, and the "primary purpose" requirement and the food-establishment exemptions carve out kosher slaughter. The city applies Ordinance 87-40 by deeming religious killings "unnecessary" while treating hunting, fishing, pest control, and euthanasia as necessary, which devalues religious reasons. The ordinances also sweep far beyond the asserted health and anti-cruelty goals. Narrower rules on garbage disposal, animal care, and methods of killing were available, yet the city banned sacrifice even in licensed slaughterhouses. Finally, the events preceding enactment, including the timing and the council members' and officials' statements of hostility toward Santeria, show that the ordinances were enacted because of, not merely in spite of, their suppression of religion. Ordinance 87-72 was passed in direct response to the Church's opening along with the others and functions with them to suppress Santeria worship.

General applicability: The government may not selectively impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances are substantially underinclusive as to preventing animal cruelty and protecting public health. Fishing, extermination of rodents, euthanasia, hunting, and disposal of garbage by restaurants are left largely unregulated, and Ordinance 87-72 exempts small-scale commercial slaughter. The city's conclusory assertions that these killings are different do not explain why religion alone bears the burden.

Strict scrutiny: Because the ordinances are neither neutral nor generally applicable, they must satisfy the most rigorous scrutiny, and they fail. They are not narrowly tailored, since they are both overbroad and underinclusive. The city's interests are not compelling where it leaves appreciable damage to those interests unprohibited and restricts only religious conduct. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Note: Part IIA-2 of Justice Kennedy's opinion (the examination of legislative motive and history) was joined by only two Justices (Kennedy and Stevens), so it is not a majority holding. The balance of the reasoning above commanded a majority.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) The terms "neutrality" and "general applicability" substantially overlap, and it does not matter under which heading each invalidating factor is discussed. Lack of neutrality applies primarily to laws that by their terms impose disabilities based on religion, while lack of general applicability applies primarily to laws that, though neutral in terms, target a particular religion's practices through design, construction, or enforcement. Part IIA-2 is not joined because it examines the subjective motivation of the lawmakers. A collective legislative body's singular motive cannot be determined, and the First Amendment speaks to the effects of laws, not the purposes of their authors. A law that singles out a religious practice for special burdens is invalid even if enacted by legislators motivated solely by a desire to prevent cruelty to animals.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (Souter, J.) This case rests on the noncontroversial principle that the Free Exercise Clause bars government action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice, so it does not present the question decided in Smith. Part II is not joined because its references to the Smith rule are dicta, and the Smith rule itself merits reexamination. Smith adopted a narrow formal conception of neutrality in tension with decades of precedent that applied strict scrutiny to formally neutral, generally applicable laws burdening religion, including Yoder, Sherbert, and Thomas. Smith was announced without full briefing and was unnecessary to the outcome, and neither text nor original understanding clearly supports it. The tension should be resolved in a future case that squarely presents it.

Concurring in the judgment (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.) Smith was wrongly decided because it treated the Free Exercise Clause as a mere antidiscrimination principle, ignoring religious freedom as an affirmative liberty. Any law that burdens religiously motivated practice, intentionally or not, must be justified as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. A law that explicitly targets religion necessarily fails strict scrutiny because it cannot be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, so the Court need not apply a separate neutrality test to decide this easy case. The ordinances are both overinclusive and underinclusive. A harder case would arise if petitioners sought a religious exemption from a generally applicable anticruelty law, and that question is reserved.