Does a state law banning offensive or annoying speech in public violate the First Amendment?

Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was distributing religious literature on a busy street in Rochester, New Hampshire. Some citizens complained to City Marshal Bowering that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a 'racket'. Bowering warned Chaplinsky about the restless crowd. Later, a disturbance occurred, and while Chaplinsky was being taken to the police station, he encountered Bowering. Chaplinsky addressed Bowering, calling him a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist," and claimed the entire Rochester government consisted of Fascists or their agents.

Chaplinsky was subsequently charged under a state law that prohibited the use of offensive, derisive, or annoying words in public places. This charge was based on the specific words Chaplinsky directed at Bowering during their encounter on the way to the police station.

Chaplinsky was initially convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire. He appealed this decision, which resulted in a trial de novo before a jury in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also found Chaplinsky guilty. Following this, Chaplinsky appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which affirmed the conviction. Undeterred, Chaplinsky then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that the statute under which he was convicted violated his First Amendment rights.

(Murphy, J.)

No. A state law banning offensive or annoying speech in public does not violate the First Amendment when narrowly tailored to prohibit "fighting words." The First Amendment does not protect all forms of speech. Certain well-defined and narrowly limited categories of speech, including lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and insulting or "fighting" words, fall outside constitutional protection due to their minimal social value and potential to cause harm. "Fighting words" are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and cause a breach of the peace. The government has a legitimate interest in preventing such breaches and maintaining public order. A statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct within this unprotected category of speech falls within the domain of state power and does not infringe upon First Amendment rights. The determination of whether particular words constitute "fighting words" depends on their likelihood to provoke an immediate violent response in the average person under the circumstances. Words such as "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist," when directed at an individual in a face-to-face confrontation, meet this standard. The application of the "fighting words" doctrine requires careful consideration of context and a narrow interpretation to avoid unduly restricting protected speech. This principle balances the need to safeguard freedom of expression with the state's interest in preserving peace and preventing violence.