Does a state statute that punishes addressing offensive, derisive, or annoying words to another person in a public place violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it is construed to prohibit only face-to-face words likely to provoke the average addressee to a breach of the peace?

Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, distributed his sect's literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, on a busy Saturday afternoon. Citizens complained to City Marshal Bowering that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a 'racket.' Bowering told them Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged but warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. A disturbance later occurred, and a traffic officer began escorting Chaplinsky toward the police station without telling him he was under arrest. On the way they met Bowering, who had heard a riot was underway and was hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated his warning, and Chaplinsky addressed him with the words 'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.' Chaplinsky admitted saying the words other than the name of the Deity, and testified that he had asked Bowering to arrest those responsible for the disturbance and that Bowering cursed him in reply. The trial court excluded as immaterial testimony about Chaplinsky's religious mission, his treatment by the crowd, and alleged police neglect.

Chaplinsky was convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violating Chapter 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire. He appealed to the Superior Court, where he received a trial de novo before a jury and was found guilty. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754, overruling his claims that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by unreasonably restraining freedom of speech, press, and worship and was vague and indefinite. Chaplinsky then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

(Murphy, J.)

No. The statute, as construed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court and as applied to Chaplinsky, does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Only a free speech challenge is warranted, because the spoken word is involved and cursing a public officer is not the exercise of religion. Even if Chaplinsky's earlier activities were religious, they would not immunize concomitant acts that violate a valid criminal statute.

Free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. Certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never raised any Constitutional problem, include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting or 'fighting' words, those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court construed the statute to forbid only face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, judged by what men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. So limited, the statute is narrowly drawn to punish specific conduct within state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.

This same construction defeats the vagueness challenge, because a statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not to unduly impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law. The appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and cause a breach of the peace. Refusing to admit evidence of provocation or the truth of the utterances raises no Constitutional objection; whether such facts constitute a defense or mitigation is for the state court. The conviction is affirmed.