Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 require a party moving for summary judgment, who does not bear the burden of proof at trial, to support its motion with affidavits or other evidence negating the opponent's claim, or may it prevail by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to produce evidence establishing an essential element of its case?

Myrtle Nell Catrett (respondent), as administratrix of her husband Louis Catrett's estate, filed a wrongful-death action in September 1980 alleging that his 1979 death resulted from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by 15 corporations, including Celotex Corporation (petitioner). The complaint sounded in negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.

In September 1981, Celotex moved for summary judgment, arguing that Catrett had failed to produce evidence that any Celotex product proximately caused the injuries alleged. Celotex noted that Catrett had not identified, in answers to interrogatories specifically requesting such information, any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's exposure to Celotex's asbestos products. In response, Catrett produced three documents: a transcript of the decedent's deposition, a letter from an official of one of the decedent's former employers whom Celotex planned to call as a trial witness, and a letter from an insurance company to Catrett's attorney. These documents tended to show that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex's asbestos products in Chicago during 1970-1971. Celotex argued the documents were inadmissible hearsay and could not be considered in opposition to the motion.

Catrett filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in September 1980. In July 1982, the District Court granted Celotex's motion for summary judgment, stating there was no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to Celotex's product in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Catrett appealed only the grant of summary judgment in favor of Celotex. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex's motion was fatally defective because Celotex made no effort to adduce evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to support it. The dissenting judge argued that the majority wrongly required an affirmative evidentiary showing even where no triable factual dispute existed. The Court of Appeals' decision conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in In re Japanese Electronic Products. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

(Rehnquist, J.)

No. A party moving for summary judgment on an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials negating the opponent's claim. The movant may discharge its burden by showing, that is, pointing out to the district court, that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.

The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. A complete failure of proof on an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial, so there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This standard mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a).

The movant always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue. But nothing in Rule 56 requires the movant to negate the opponent's claim with affidavits. Rule 56(c) refers to affidavits "if any," and Rules 56(a) and (b) permit motions "with or without supporting affidavits." Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, though not necessarily in admissible form.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), does not hold otherwise; the 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e) neither reduced nor increased the movant's burden. Because district courts may enter summary judgment sua sponte, it would defy common sense to bar a court from granting a motion requesting such disposition. Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules designed to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. No "railroading" occurred, since the motion came a year after filing and after discovery, and Rule 56(f) protects against premature motions. The judgment is reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to decide whether Catrett made an adequate showing of exposure.

Concurrence (White, J.) The movant need not always support its motion with evidence or affidavits, and may rely on depositions and interrogatory answers to show the plaintiff has no evidence. But the movant must still discharge its burden under the Rules; a bare motion or conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence is insufficient. A plaintiff need not initiate discovery or reveal witnesses unless required by the discovery rules or court order. If the plaintiff named a witness, summary judgment should not be granted without the defendant showing that the witness's possible testimony raises no genuine issue. Remand is appropriate because the Court of Appeals did not address this aspect.

Dissent (Brennan, J.) The Court's legal analysis is not disputed, but Celotex failed to satisfy its initial burden of production. A movant claiming the nonmoving party has no evidence must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record, and a conclusory assertion is insufficient. Celotex knew the record contained evidence, including a witness, Mr. Hoff, supporting the plaintiff's claim, yet ignored it and did not attack its adequacy. As in Adickes, where the defendant ignored record evidence of a policeman's presence, summary judgment was improper. The Court's opinion also fails to clearly explain what a movant must do, which will create confusion.

Dissent (Stevens, J.) Celotex's motion was based on the lack of exposure within the District of Columbia, and Catrett made an adequate showing of exposure in Illinois. The District Court's grant of summary judgment in that context was palpably erroneous, and the bare "or elsewhere" reference did not raise the complex question the Court addresses. The Court of Appeals' reversal should be affirmed on that narrow ground rather than through an abstract exercise in Rule construction. The majority answered that the District Court expressly found no showing of exposure "in the District of Columbia or elsewhere," so Stevens' reading of the ruling was factually incorrect.