Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a state court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who is personally served with process while temporarily and voluntarily present in the state, in a suit unrelated to his activities in that state?

Dennis Burnham and Francie Burnham married in West Virginia in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977, where their two children were born. In July 1987 they decided to separate, and Mrs. Burnham moved to California with the children. They had agreed she would file for divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. In October 1987, Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of desertion but never obtained a summons or attempted to serve his wife. After Burnham refused to adhere to their agreement, Mrs. Burnham filed for divorce in California state court in early January 1988. In late January 1988, Burnham traveled to southern California on business and then to the San Francisco Bay area to visit his children. On January 24, 1988, while returning his older child to Mrs. Burnham's home after a weekend in San Francisco, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. He then returned to New Jersey. His only contacts with California were a few short visits for business and to see his children.

Burnham made a special appearance in the California Superior Court for Marin County, moving to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he lacked minimum contacts with California. The Superior Court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief, holding that a defendant's presence in the forum state and personal service of process there is a valid jurisdictional predicate for in personam jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

(Scalia, J.)

No. Personal service of process on a nonresident who is voluntarily present in the forum state is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause, regardless of the brevity of the visit or whether the cause of action relates to the defendant's activities in the state. The judgment is affirmed.

The controlling standard is whether jurisdiction offends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Jurisdiction based on physical presence at the time of service is one of the continuing traditions of the American legal system that defines that standard. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, American courts widely held that personal service on a physically present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction, however fleeting the visit and whether or not the claim related to his activities in the state. No American case until 1978 held otherwise, and every State and the federal government continues the practice.

International Shoe and its progeny do not undermine this rule. The 'minimum contacts' test was developed to justify novel, nontraditional assertions of jurisdiction over absent defendants who were not served in the forum. Nothing in those cases suggests that presence in the forum, the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction, has ceased to suffice. As Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), explained, a practice sanctioned by settled usage is due process, though age is not the only quality of due process.

The plurality (Part II-D, which Justice White did not join) reasoned that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), does not compel a different result. Shaffer involved an absent defendant and held that quasi in rem jurisdiction based on property ownership must satisfy the minimum contacts and litigation-relatedness requirements. It did not extend those requirements to defendants physically present and served in the forum. The plurality, without Justice White, added that where a jurisdictional principle is both firmly approved by tradition and still widely followed, no standard exists for declaring it 'no longer justified.' Due process does not turn on individual Justices' subjective notions of fairness.

Concurrence in part and in the judgment (White, J.) Joins Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C of the plurality and concurs in the judgment. The rule allowing jurisdiction over a nonresident by personal in-state service has been so widely accepted that it cannot be struck down on its face or as applied under the Due Process Clause. No showing has been made that the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it violates due process in every case. Claims that the rule operates unfairly in individual cases need not be entertained where presence in the forum is intentional, otherwise there would be endless fact-specific litigation.

Concurrence in the judgment (Brennan, J.) Joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, JJ. Transient jurisdiction generally comports with due process, but historical pedigree alone is not dispositive. International Shoe and Shaffer require that every assertion of state-court jurisdiction, even under a traditional rule, satisfy contemporary notions of due process, so an independent fairness inquiry is required. Tradition is relevant because it gives a defendant voluntarily present in a state clear notice of potential suit there. A transient defendant also avails himself of the state's benefits (police, fire, and emergency services, roads, and economy), is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, faces slight burdens given modern travel, communication, and procedural devices, and would otherwise create an asymmetry by suing in the forum as plaintiff while being immune as defendant. As a rule, jurisdiction based on voluntary presence satisfies due process. The plurality answered that these benefits and burdens would justify jurisdiction over anyone, served or not, that the reasonable expectation of suit is just tradition, and that the contemporary notions standard is subjective.

Concurrence in the judgment (Stevens, J.) Declines to join either the plurality or Justice Brennan's opinion because of concern about their unnecessarily broad reach. The historical evidence and consensus, the considerations of fairness, and the common sense displayed by Justice White all combine to show this is a very easy case, and the judgment should be affirmed.