Does Congress violate the constitutional separation of powers by assigning executive functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to the Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress through a joint resolution?

On December 12, 1985, the President signed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which set declining maximum deficit amounts for fiscal years 1986 through 1991 and mandated across-the-board spending cuts when projected deficits exceeded those targets. Under Section 251, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office jointly report deficit estimates and program-by-program reductions to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General reviews those reports and issues his own report to the President. The President must then issue a sequestration order implementing the Comptroller General's calculations without modification. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list recommended by congressional leaders, confirmed by the Senate, and removable only by impeachment or by joint resolution of Congress for specified causes such as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. The Act also contains a fallback provision, Section 274(f), under which a special congressional joint committee would produce the report if the Section 251 procedures were invalidated. Congressman Synar, who had voted against the Act, sued within hours of its signing, and the National Treasury Employees Union sued over suspended benefit increases for its members.

Congressman Synar filed suit seeking declaratory relief, and eleven other Members of Congress later joined him. The National Treasury Employees Union filed a nearly identical suit, and an individual Union member was later added as a plaintiff. A three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia, convened under 2 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5), held that the Union had standing and that the Members had standing under the congressional standing doctrine. The court rejected the challenge based on the nondelegation doctrine, but it held that the Comptroller General's role violated separation of powers because he performs executive functions while being removable by Congress. It therefore invalidated the reporting provisions. Appeals were taken directly to the Supreme Court under Section 274(b) of the Act. The Court noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration.

(Burger, J.)

Yes. Congress cannot reserve for itself the power to remove an officer charged with executing the laws except by impeachment, and the Comptroller General's functions under Section 251 are executive functions that he cannot constitutionally perform while removable by Congress.

Standing: Members of the Union, who stood to lose scheduled benefit increases, suffered injury sufficient for Article III standing and standing under Section 274(a)(2), so the Court did not reach the standing of the Members of Congress or the Union itself.

Separation of powers: The Constitution divides power among three branches to diffuse power and secure liberty. It gives Congress no active role in supervising officers who execute the laws, and it provides for removal of officers by Congress only through impeachment for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The Decision of 1789, in which Madison's position that Congress should play no removal role prevailed, is weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), confirm that congressional participation in removing executive officers is impermissible. If an officer answerable only to Congress executes the laws, Congress in practical terms controls execution. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), holds that Congress may influence execution of the laws only through new legislation satisfying bicameralism and presentment.

The Comptroller General is subservient to Congress. He is removable by joint resolution at any time for broad grounds, including inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. These terms are vague enough to sustain removal for perceived transgressions of the legislative will, and the Framers rejected "maladministration" as grounds for impeachment for precisely that reason. The legislative history shows Congress intended the Comptroller General to be under its control. Congress has repeatedly designated him a legislative officer, and Comptrollers General have described themselves as agents of Congress.

Executive function: Under Section 251 the Comptroller General exercises judgment about facts, interprets the Act to determine the required budget calculations, and issues a report that the President must follow without modification. Interpreting and implementing a law enacted by Congress is the essence of execution. By placing execution of the Act in an officer removable by itself, Congress retained control over execution and intruded into the executive function.

Remedy: The Court declined to sever the 1921 removal provision. The Act's own fallback provision in Section 274(f) supplies the remedy and takes effect when the reporting procedures are invalidated. Efficiency and convenience cannot save a procedure that is contrary to the Constitution. The District Court's judgment is affirmed, and the judgment is stayed for up to 60 days to allow Congress to implement the fallback provisions.

Concurring in the judgment (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall, J.) The congressional removal power is dormant and carefully circumscribed, and it is not the constitutional defect. The majority answered that the removal grounds are very broad and make the Comptroller General subservient to Congress. Labeling the Comptroller General's functions "executive" is unsound because governmental power cannot be sorted into rigid categories, and a function takes on the character of the office to which it is assigned. The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress because of his longstanding statutory duties, which are overwhelmingly owed to Congress, and Congress has repeatedly declared him part of the legislative branch. Section 251 requires him to make policy that binds the Nation. When Congress or its agent makes binding policy, it must follow Article I, which requires passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. Congress may delegate lawmaking power to the executive or to independent agencies, but it may not delegate that power to one of its own agents, because doing so would evade the constitutional restraints on legislation that Chadha enforces.

Dissent (White, J.) The majority's formalistic view of separation of powers strikes down a major legislative response to a national crisis because of a trivial and dormant feature of a 65-year-old statute. Congress may vest executive authority in officers independent of the President, as Humphrey's Executor recognizes. Removal of the Comptroller requires a joint resolution, which must satisfy bicameralism and presentment, so it is not a Chadha-type veto. Removal is allowed only for specified cause after a hearing and is subject to the President's veto, so Congress could remove the Comptroller over Presidential opposition only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. In practice the Comptroller is one of the most independent officers in the government. The removal power poses no real threat of congressional aggrandizement. The majority answered that the statutory grounds are very broad, that Congress could remove him over a veto, and that the Comptroller General is subservient to Congress. Even if the provision were incompatible with the Act, striking the never-used removal provision would be the proper remedy. The Act is also not an unlawful delegation.

Dissent (Blackmun, J.) Congress's direct participation in removing an executive officer other than by impeachment might violate separation of powers, but the Court need not decide that question. The only relief sought was invalidation of the Act's budget-reduction provisions, and that relief should be denied even if the incompatibility exists. The congressional removal power is a cumbersome, never-exercised relic. If two statutory provisions are incompatible, the Court should invalidate the one whose removal least disrupts congressional objectives. That is the 1921 removal provision, not the central provisions of one of the most important federal enactments in decades. The Comptroller's evident independence from Congress shows that the removal provision played little role in the choice of the Comptroller General for these duties. The majority answered that severing the removal provision would significantly alter the Comptroller General's office and yield a statute Congress would probably not have adopted, and that the Act's fallback provision settles the remedy.