Does the assignment of specific duties to the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers?

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, was enacted on December 12, 1985. The legislation set maximum deficit amounts for federal spending from fiscal years 1986 to 1991, with the goal of eliminating the federal budget deficit. If the deficit surpassed the specified limit, the Act mandated across-the-board reductions in federal spending.

Under the Act, the Comptroller General was tasked with reviewing deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations made by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. The Comptroller General would then issue a report to the President, who was required to implement a sequestration order enforcing the spending cuts outlined by the Comptroller General. Notably, the Act stipulated that Congress could remove the Comptroller General through a joint resolution.

Congressman Synar and eleven other Members of Congress filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief that the Act was unconstitutional immediately after it was signed. The National Treasury Employees Union filed a similar lawsuit. A three-judge District Court was appointed to hear the consolidated case. The District Court ruled that while the Act did not violate the delegation doctrine, it did violate the constitutional separation of powers. Following this decision, appeals were taken directly to the Supreme Court for final adjudication.

(Burger, C.J.)

Yes. The assignment of specific duties to the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The Act impermissibly vests executive power in an officer removable by Congress, thereby encroaching on the executive branch's authority. The Constitution does not allow Congress to retain control over the execution of laws through the power of removal. Once legislation is enacted, congressional involvement must end; any further control can only be exercised indirectly through new legislation. The Comptroller General, subject to removal by Congress, cannot constitutionally perform executive functions. This arrangement undermines the fundamental separation of powers doctrine, which is designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive authority in any single branch of government. The Constitution's carefully crafted system of checks and balances is compromised when Congress can directly influence the execution of laws through the threat of removal. This violates the core principle that the power to execute laws must remain separate from the power to make them. The Act's structure effectively allows Congress to retain control over the law's execution, intruding into the executive domain and disrupting the constitutional balance of power. This unconstitutional fusion of legislative and executive functions cannot stand, as it threatens the integrity of the governmental structure established by the Constitution.

Concurrence (Stevens, J.) The Comptroller General must be characterized as an agent of Congress due to his longstanding statutory responsibilities. When Congress seeks to make policy that will bind the Nation through such an agent, it must follow the procedures mandated by Article I of the Constitution. This principle ensures proper legislative process and maintains the separation of powers.

Dissent (White, J.) The Court's decision rests on a feature of the legislative scheme that is of minimal practical significance and presents no substantial threat to the basic scheme of separation of powers. The removal provision does not render the Comptroller General subservient to Congress. This overstates the impact of the provision and unnecessarily restricts Congress's ability to structure executive functions.

Dissent (Blackmun, J.) Even if the Comptroller General's functions under the Act are incompatible with the removal provision, striking down the central provisions of the Deficit Control Act is not the appropriate remedy. Instead, the removal provision should be invalidated. This approach would preserve the core legislative intent while addressing the constitutional concern, demonstrating a more measured response to separation of powers issues.