Does a federal district court have jurisdiction, and do voters have standing, to hear an equal protection challenge to a state legislative apportionment, and is such a challenge a justiciable controversy rather than a nonjusticiable political question?

Residents of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby Counties in Tennessee, who were qualified voters, sued on behalf of themselves and similarly situated voters. They challenged a 1901 Tennessee statute apportioning seats in the 99-member House and 33-member Senate among the State's 95 counties. The Tennessee Constitution required apportionment according to the number of qualified voters, with a decennial enumeration. The legislature had not reapportioned since 1901, and every reapportionment proposal in the preceding 60 years had failed. Between 1901 and 1960, Tennessee's eligible voting population grew from 487,380 to 2,092,891 and shifted significantly among counties. The plaintiffs alleged that the 1901 apportionment was arbitrary even when enacted and had become obsolete, and that it debased their votes and denied them equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed no practical avenue for relief existed because the malapportioned legislature controlled constitutional amendment and convention calls. They sought a declaration of unconstitutionality, an injunction against further elections under the statute, and an order requiring reapportionment or at-large elections.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. A single district judge, reviewing this Court's prior decisions and finding them distinguishable, ordered a three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The three-judge court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, relying on Colegrove v. Green and later cases. 179 F. Supp. 824. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard argument in 1961, set the case for reargument, and heard it again in October 1961.

(Brennan, J.)

Yes. The district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the equal protection claim is justiciable, so dismissal was error.

Jurisdiction: The complaint alleges a deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, so it arises under the Constitution within Article III, § 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). A federal claim defeats jurisdiction only if it is wholly insubstantial or frivolous, and this one is not. Failure to state a claim goes to the merits, not jurisdiction. Colegrove v. Green did not hold otherwise, because a majority of the Justices there found jurisdiction, and a long line of reapportionment cases proceeded to the merits.

Standing: The plaintiffs assert a personal stake: their votes are allegedly debased relative to voters in favored counties. They claim a direct interest in the effectiveness of their votes, not a generalized grievance about government administration. That suffices for standing, and the Court's precedents, including Colegrove, support it.

Justiciability: The political question doctrine is a function of the separation of powers, not of the federal courts' relationship to the States. After reviewing cases on foreign relations, the duration of hostilities, the validity of enactments, and the status of Indian tribes, the Court identifies the marks of a political question: a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political branch; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards; the impossibility of deciding without an initial nonjudicial policy determination; the impossibility of resolution without disrespect to coordinate branches; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and the potential for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements. None is present here. Cases under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, § 4, are nonjusticiable because they involve these elements (Luther v. Borden), not because they touch state governmental organization. This claim rests on the Equal Protection Clause, for which judicial standards are well developed, and it may proceed whether or not a Guaranty Clause claim would fail. The Court does not decide the merits or the remedy, which are for the district court on remand.

Concurrence (Douglas, J.) The right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government, and the Equal Protection Clause limits how a State may weight votes. The test is invidious discrimination, and the plaintiffs must be allowed to prove it. Some of the older "political question" holdings were wrongly decided. Courts routinely decide complex questions, and the claim here is no more intricate than other equal protection claims. Federal courts have long protected voting rights, and equitable remedies can be shaped as needed.

Concurrence (Clark, J.) Tennessee's apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis, a patent violation of equal protection. The State's own policy of equality by qualified voters has not been followed, and the disparities appear even among counties of like population. The plaintiffs have no practical political remedy: Tennessee has no initiative or referendum, and the Assembly controls the amendment and convention routes. An effective remedy is available, such as consolidating some districts and reallocating seats. Clark would have reached the merits but acquiesces in the remand.

Concurrence (Stewart, J.) The Court decides only that the district court had jurisdiction, that the complaint presents a justiciable controversy, and that the plaintiffs have standing. The Court does not hold that the Constitution requires approximately equal voting strength, and it does not decide that any particular apportionment is invalid. The merits are for the trial court, and the State has not yet filed an answer.

Dissent (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J.) The decision overturns a uniform line of decisions, including Kidd v. McCanless, which dismissed an attack on this very Tennessee statute. The claim is a Guaranty Clause claim in equal protection garb, and it is nonjusticiable for the same reasons: no judicial standards exist for weighing the nonlegal factors that shape apportionment. Representation proportioned to population has never been a universal American or English practice, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose it. Courts cannot fashion workable relief without entering the political thicket, and relief must come from an informed, civically militant electorate. The majority answered that the claim neither rests on nor implicates the Guaranty Clause, that Equal Protection standards are well developed, and that Kidd rested on an adequate state ground.

Dissent (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J.) The complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution does not require approximately equal voting weight in state legislatures. Tennessee's apportionment is not irrational, because a legislature may rationally preserve a stable balance of rural and urban interests. The arithmetic in Clark's concurrence ignores many permissible policies and is itself flawed. Legislative motive is not for courts to probe.