Must a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a libel case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists?

Liberty Lobby, Inc., a nonprofit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder and treasurer Willis Carto (respondents) were the subjects of articles published in October 1981 in The Investigator magazine. Two long articles, "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," were introduced by a shorter article, "America's Neo-Nazi Underground." Together the articles portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents alleged that some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the three articles were false and derogatory. They sued Jack Anderson, the magazine's publisher, Bill Adkins, president and chief executive officer of Investigator Publishing Co., and the company itself (petitioners). After discovery, petitioners submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, who wrote the two longer articles, stating that he spent substantial time researching the pieces, drew his facts from a wide variety of sources, and believed the facts were truthful and accurate. An appendix listed his sources for each challenged statement. Respondents argued that Bermant relied on patently unreliable sources and failed adequately to verify his information, and they offered evidence that an editor, William McGaw, told Adkins before publication that the articles were "terrible" and "ridiculous."

Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures, so New York Times applied, and that Bermant's thorough investigation and reliance on numerous sources precluded a finding of actual malice. It granted summary judgment for petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement of proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence did not have to be considered at the summary judgment stage, and that a jury could reasonably conclude the nine statements were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because that holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.

(White, J.)

Yes. A court ruling on a summary judgment motion in a New York Times case must be guided by the clear-and-convincing standard in deciding whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists. The Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, so its decision is vacated and the case remanded.

Rule 56(c) requires no genuine issue as to any material fact. Materiality is set by the substantive law: only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome under the governing law preclude summary judgment. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not create one. First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).

This inquiry mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a): whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Because that inquiry asks whether a jury could reasonably find for either party, it necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary burden of proof applicable at trial. In an ordinary civil case the judge asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. A criminal acquittal motion asks whether a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Likewise, where New York Times requires actual malice to be shown with convincing clarity, the judge must ask whether a reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Without that benchmark, the question of what a jury could reasonably find cannot be answered.

This does not authorize trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, and legitimate inferences remain jury functions; the nonmovant's evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. A plaintiff also cannot defeat a properly supported motion by merely asserting that the jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of actual malice, because the plaintiff must offer affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in its favor. Cities Service, 391 U.S. at 290; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).

Dissent (Brennan, J.) The Court's conclusion that substantive evidentiary standards govern the genuine-issue inquiry rests on no case law. Cities Service and Adickes turned on whether the substantive law permitted particular inferences, not on how one-sided the evidence was. The opinion contradicts itself by forbidding judges to weigh evidence while directing them to assess the quantum, caliber, and quantity of proof. The ruling threatens to turn summary judgment into a paper trial on the merits and raises concerns about the constitutional right to a jury trial. The majority answers that its holding does not denigrate the jury's role and does not authorize trial on affidavits, since credibility, weighing of evidence, and inferences remain jury functions. A plaintiff who presents evidence supporting every element of the claim has made a prima facie case, and whether the evidence is clear and convincing is for the factfinder.

Dissent (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J.) The clear-and-convincing standard is a procedural requirement engrafted onto Rule 56, contrary to Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which declined to give libel defendants special procedural protections. The majority answers in a footnote that the standard is a substantive evidentiary burden, not a special procedural protection for libel defendants. The Court's own rule that credibility is for the jury means the standard changes nothing in cases resting on testimonial evidence, and it offers no guidance on when the standard would matter. It also fails to apply the new rule to the facts of this case. The standard of proof is a state of mind for factfinders that does not translate into a pretrial question of law, so the decision will make trial courts' summary judgment rulings in libel cases more erratic and inconsistent.