Must trial courts consider the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence when ruling on summary judgment motions in libel cases involving public figures?

Liberty Lobby, Inc., a nonprofit corporation and self-described "citizens' lobby," and its founder Willis Carto filed a libel action against Jack Anderson and others in federal district court. The suit challenged statements in The Investigator magazine that portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. The articles were written by Charles Bermant, who submitted an affidavit stating he had thoroughly researched the articles using numerous sources and believed the facts were truthful and accurate. Respondents opposed summary judgment, claiming Bermant relied on patently unreliable sources and failed to adequately verify information before publishing. They also presented evidence that an editor had told the publisher before publication that the articles were "terrible" and "ridiculous." The district court found respondents were limited-purpose public figures subject to New York Times standards and granted summary judgment, finding Bermant's investigation precluded a finding of actual malice.

Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures requiring proof under New York Times standards and granted summary judgment for petitioners. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements but reversed as to 9 allegedly defamatory statements. The Court of Appeals held that the requirement to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to conflicts among the circuits regarding whether New York Times requirements must be considered on summary judgment motions.

(White, J.)

Yes. Trial courts must consider the heightened evidentiary standard when ruling on summary judgment motions in libel cases involving public figures. Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue exists when evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The inquiry mirrors the standard for directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), asking whether evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require jury submission or is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.

The substantive evidentiary standard necessarily implicates summary judgment determinations. When New York Times requires actual malice to be shown with "convincing clarity," trial judges must ask whether reasonable jurors could find by clear and convincing evidence that actual malice exists. The judge's inquiry unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find the required standard met. This principle applies equally to directed verdict motions, where judges consider whether reasonable factfinders could conclude the plaintiff showed actual malice with convincing clarity.

The determination of whether factual disputes require jury submission must be guided by substantive evidentiary standards. Trial judges must view evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden, asking whether evidence presented could support a reasonable jury finding either that plaintiff proved the case by the required quality and quantity of evidence or that plaintiff did not. There is no genuine issue if evidence in opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. However, credibility determinations, weighing evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences remain jury functions, with all justifiable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.

Dissent (Brennan, J.) The Court's analysis rests on unconnected and unsupported observations without explaining how evidentiary standards should be considered or what trial judges should actually do. The opinion contains conflicting signals, stating judges should not weigh evidence while simultaneously instructing them to assess the "quantum" and "caliber" of evidence. This creates confusion between directing judges not to weigh evidence and requiring them to determine whether evidence meets required standards. The decision may transform summary judgment into a full paper trial on the merits and raises constitutional concerns about the right to jury trial. If a plaintiff presents evidence supporting all elements needed to prevail, either directly or by permissible inference, a prima facie case exists and summary judgment must fail regardless of the burden of proof. Whether evidence is "clear and convincing" should be for the factfinder to determine.

Dissent (Rehnquist, J.) The Court mistakenly engrafts a substantive evidentiary standard onto Rule 56, contrary to previous statements that special procedural protections should not be granted to libel defendants beyond constitutional protections in substantive law. The Court fails to apply its newly announced rule to the case facts, providing only abstractions without practical guidance. In many cases involving credibility determinations, the higher standard would have no effect at all, since credibility remains exclusively for the jury whether the standard is preponderance, clear and convincing, or beyond reasonable doubt. The decision will likely cause more erratic and inconsistent trial judge decisions in libel cases by creating a new standard without explaining how it applies to particular cases.