Does the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's definition of "solid waste" as "discarded material" authorize EPA to regulate secondary materials that are reused or recycled within an industry's ongoing production process and have not been disposed of or abandoned?

Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to regulate hazardous waste, a subset of "solid waste," which the statute defines to include "other discarded material." EPA's interpretation of that term evolved. In 1980, interim regulations reached manufacturing or mining by-products that were "sometimes discarded." In 1983, EPA proposed narrowing amendments that excluded materials used or reused as effective substitutes for raw materials in processes using raw materials as principal feedstocks. In January 1985, EPA issued a final rule treating five categories of secondary materials (spent materials, sludges, by-products, commercial chemical products, and scrap metal) as solid waste when they are disposed of, burned for energy recovery, reclaimed, or accumulated speculatively. The rule exempted only materials directly reused as ingredients or commercial-product substitutes, or returned to their original process as raw material substitutes (the "closed-loop" exception), provided they were not first reclaimed. The American Mining Congress and the American Petroleum Institute, trade associations for mining and oil refining, challenged the rule. They contended that petroleum refiners and metal producers continuously recapture and reuse hydrocarbons, ores, and metal-bearing dusts within ongoing production, and that these in-process materials are not discarded.

EPA promulgated its final rule on January 4, 1985, at 50 Fed. Reg. 614. The American Mining Congress and Engelhard Corporation (No. 85-1206) and the American Petroleum Institute (No. 85-1208) petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the rule. The petitions were consolidated, and Edison Electric Institute, American Paper Institute, and the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council intervened. The court heard argument on October 14, 1986, and decided the case on July 31, 1987.

(Starr, J.)

No. RCRA's definition of solid waste does not authorize EPA to regulate in-process secondary materials. Under Chevron, if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question, that intent controls, and Cardoza-Fonseca confirms that pure questions of statutory construction are for the courts. EPA's shifting interpretations also receive less deference than a consistently held view.

The statutory language, structure, and purpose show clear congressional intent to reach only materials that are actually discarded. The ordinary meaning of "discarded" is disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned, and materials retained for immediate reuse in an ongoing production process do not fit that meaning. RCRA addresses the growing problem of waste disposal, and materials destined for beneficial reuse by the generating industry are not yet part of that problem. This case resembles Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., where an agency could not stretch a specific statutory term, and differs from United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, where leaving wetlands unregulated would have defeated the statute's purpose.

EPA's statutory arguments are largely circular because the cited provisions speak of "hazardous waste" or "solid waste" and so presuppose the term at issue. The two provisions with potential merit, Sec. 6924(r)(2) and Sec. 6924(q)(1), fall within a section governing hazardous waste treatment facilities and address narrow problems, so they do not rewrite the definitional section. The definition's specificity, and its pattern of particular classes (garbage, refuse, sludge) followed by "other discarded material," invoke ejusdem generis and indicate that the general phrase covers similar materials.

The legislative history, considered despite the clarity of the text, confirms this reading. The 1976 House Report stated that much industrial waste is reclaimed or reused and is not part of the discarded-materials disposal problem. The 1984 committee language EPA cites is ambiguous and addresses hazardous waste. Congress therefore limited EPA's authority to materials discarded by being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away, and the petitions for review are granted.

Dissent (Mikva, J.) The statute is at minimum ambiguous, so Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca require deference to EPA's reasonable construction. Section 6924(r)(2) exempts materials reinserted on-site into the refining process from the labelling requirement, and Sec. 6924(q)(2)(A) exempts petroleum refinery wastes converted to petroleum coke at the same facility. Those exemptions would be unnecessary if on-site recycled materials were beyond RCRA. The 1984 House Report states that materials being used, reused, recycled, or reclaimed can be solid and hazardous wastes, which would make no sense if such materials were already hazardous waste. RCRA's definition of "disposal" is functional, covering spilling, leaking, and placing waste on land or water so it may enter the environment, so the manufacturer's intent to reuse is irrelevant to the hazard. EPA reasonably concluded that in-process secondary materials pose the same risks as abandoned waste, and its categories regulate them only when they present those risks. Under Riverside Bayview, the agency's technically grounded judgment should stand, and the majority substitutes its own view for that judgment. The majority's answer is that Sec. 6924 governs hazardous waste treatment facilities, that its reading of Sec. 6924(q)(2)(A) is consistent, and that the 1984 committee statements are ambiguous and address hazardous waste. The majority also answers that Congress's care and precision in defining "disposal" shows it meant specific content, not a functional reading.